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Modeling and predicting both average and extreme hospitalization expenditures and 
financing health care expenditures within the Singapore context are the key issues 
addressed in this thesis.  
 
As a precursor to modeling, the first essay (second chapter) examines how the elderly 
Singaporeans offset their hospital bill. The government subsidy that a patient receives, on 
average, covers 60% of the total charges of a hospitalization episode. After accounting 
for the government subsidy, medical savings accounts of the patient and family member, 
together, offset about 68% of the subsidized hospital bill. The contribution of insurance 
(both the government and private) is small, covering only 15% of the subsidized bill. 
Direct out-of-pocket payment comprises 6.3% of the subsidized bill.  
 
The second essay (third chapter) explores the best model to predict the mean inpatient 
expenditure incurred by the elderly Singaporeans and estimates the impact of various 
covariates such as demographic characteristics, clinical factors, outcome of 
hospitalization, length of stay, insurance status on mean expenditure via marginal and 
incremental effects. The findings show that, compared to ward C, the average bill of a 
hospitalization episode in ward A is higher by S$8,241 and the bill in ward B1 is higher 
by S$5,686. The difference between ward B2 and ward C bills narrows down to S$657. 
In case of a surgical operation, the average bill per episode is approximately S$1,043 
more than the episodes without any operation and the difference in case of an implant is 
S$2,411. The average bill is S$876 more in the event of death of a patient in the hospital. 
v 
 
For patients who had payouts from the government insurance, other things being equal, 
the mean expense per admission is S$288 higher than for patients without payout. In case 
of private health insurance, the difference is S$395. If slope parameters remain the same, 
the model can be used for out-of-sample predictions through intercept adjustments as the 
expenditure profile shifts over time. 
 
In the third essay (fourth chapter), the probabilities of incurring catastrophic health care 
expenditures by the elderly Singaporeans are predicted and factors that increase the 
likelihood of facing such expenditures are determined. The results show that the 
probability of incurring hospitalization expenditure more than S$10,000 by the elderly 
with the government insurance varies from 1.7 to 8.8% while the corresponding 
probability range for the elderly without the government insurance is 0.9 to 4.9%. This 
difference is more pronounced for private insurance (2.9-10.8% versus 0.9-5.3%). 
Among different diseases afflicting the elderly, the probability of catastrophic 
expenditure is highest for musculoskeletal diseases. The oldest old face the lowest 
probability of catastrophic expenditure. As in the second essay, the model can be adapted 
for out-of-sample predictions through intercept adjustments. 
 
A significant proportion of the elderly are not covered by any health insurance in 
Singapore. One of the reasons cited for low uptake of the catastrophic illness insurance 
offered by the government is that it is characterized by high deductibles. In the fourth 
essay (fifth chapter), a simulation model is developed to estimate the size of optimal 
deductible for the government insurance in Singapore. The result shows that the optimal 
vi 
 
deductible is S$1000 (in 2007 dollars) for the base case scenario which matches the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Singapore has managed to achieve health outcome indicators that compare well with 
those of OECD countries. For instance, it has one of the lowest under-five mortality 
rates
1
 at 3 per 1,000 live births, same as that of Japan and Sweden, while under-five 
mortality rate of Germany is 4, Australia 5, U.K. 6, Canada 6 and U.S. 8. What makes 
Singapore’s achievement laudable is that it has done so at a fraction of the cost of OECD 
countries. Total health care spending of Singapore has been less than 4% of its GDP, the 
lowest in comparison to all OECD countries. For the sake of comparison, note that total 
health care spending as a percentage of GDP of Japan in year 2007 was 8%, U.K. 8.4%, 
Australia 8.9%, Sweden 9.1%, Canada 10.1%, Germany 10.4% and U.S. 15.7% (WHO, 
2010). WHO (2000) ranked Singapore's
 
health care system sixth in the world in terms of 
the overall performance. The ranking of Japan is 10, U.K. 18, Sweden 23, Germany 25, 
Canada 30, Australia 32, and U.S. 37.  
 
This outstanding performance of Singapore’s health care system merits an in-depth 
analysis of the system. However, due to paucity of space, it is only briefly described in 
the following sections, Singapore’s health care delivery system in Section 1.2 and health 
care financing system in Section 1.3. A discussion of the challenges posed by 
Singapore’s ageing population is given in Section 1.4 and the government’s response to 
                                                 
 
1
 According to WHO definition, under-five mortality rate is the probability of a child born in a specific year 
or period dying before reaching the age of five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of that period. It is, 
2 
 
meet those challenges is summarized in Sub-section 1.4.1 and an account of health care 
financing policies for the elderly is given in Sub-section 1.4.2. Section 1.5 highlights the 
focus of the thesis.   
1.2 Singapore’s Health Care Delivery System   
In Singapore, health care services are provided by both the public and private sector. 
Currently, the public sector provides 80% of hospital care and the private sector accounts 
for 80% of primary care (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
2
). Charges of the public 
sector health services are regulated by the government and they are subsidized for the 
lower income groups who cannot afford to pay the private patient charges. In private 
hospitals and outpatient clinics, patients pay the amount charged by hospitals and doctors. 
Both the public and private sectors operate on a fee-for-service basis. Voluntary welfare 
organizations are the main suppliers of step-down care. Most of these organizations are 
funded by the government for their services rendered to patients. 
1.3 Singapore’s Health Care Financing System 
The National Health Plan (NHP) of 1983 and the White paper on affordable health care 
of 1993 are identified as two key health policy documents in Singapore (Phua, 1991; Liu 
and Yue, 1999; Reisman, 2006; Asher and Nandy, 2006). Both these documents 
emphasize on individual responsibility as the corner-stone of the country’s health care 
financing philosophy. Besides the individual, the family is adjudged to have a “primary” 
responsibility in caring for the aged.  
 
                                                 
 
2
 http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/costs_and_financing.html (Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011)    
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To help Singaporeans pay their medical expenses, the government introduced a 
compulsory medical savings account scheme known as Medisave in 1984. The rationale 
behind the savings approach adopted by the government is that the current generation of 
wage-earners should save for their health care needs in old age instead of relying on the 
uncertain taxes of the future generations for support as in the social insurance system. 
Thus, the system would not place an unduly heavy burden on the declining number of the 
young and productive in an ageing society. Moreover, it is believed to generate efficiency 
gains by restraining overconsumption of health services common in any third-party 
financing system (Lim, 2004). Two complementary schemes, MediShield and Medifund, 
were implemented later. Medisave and MediShield operate within a broader government-
regulated compulsory savings scheme called the Central Provident Fund. An overview of 
the financing system is given below.  
 
1.3.1 Medical Savings Accounts (Medisave)  
Medisave is a country-wide compulsory medical savings program administered by the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF) board. It is intended to help Singaporeans pay for inpatient 
and some expensive outpatient services (such as blood transfusion for thalassemia, 
chemotherapy, radiotherapy, hepatitis B immunization, some chronic diseases, approved 
drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment) and build up funds to meet their future personal and 
immediate family members’ health care expenses. Under the scheme, an amount 
equivalent to 7 to 9% (depending on the age group) of the gross monthly wage is 
contributed to a saving account by employee and employer in a fixed proportion 
4 
 




 A cap on monthly contribution prevents high 
income earners from contributing excessive amounts. Further, any Medisave contribution 
in excess of the prevailing Medisave Contribution Ceiling
5
 (MCC) is transferred to other 
government-regulated savings mechanisms within the framework of the Central 
Provident Fund.
6
 The contributions are tax exempted and earn interest. Medisave account 
holders can withdraw their savings at or after age of 55 after keeping aside a stipulated 
minimum sum of S$32,000 in their account (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
7
).  In 
order to conserve Medisave balances for future medical needs, especially in old age, there 
is a limit on the amount that can be withdrawn from Medisave which depends on 







JHmbC%2bnfKMx65JY2Wvs6U%3d (Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011) 
4
 The self-employed persons who earn a net trade income of more than S$6000 a year need to contribute to 
Medisave. The contribution rates of self-employed persons are based on their age and net trade income 
(Central Provident Fund Board, Singapore website http://ask-s.cpf.gov.sg/explorefaq.asp?category=23043  
Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011).  
 
5
 Medisave Contribution Ceiling (MCC) is the maximum balance a member may have in his/her Medisave 
account. The current MCC is set at S$41,000 (Ministry of Health, Singapore website 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/costs_and_financing/schemes_subisdies/medisave/Medisa
ve_Contributions.html, Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011). 
 
6 Any Medisave contributions in excess of the Medisave Contribution Ceiling will be transferred from the 
Medisave account to the Special account for members aged below 55, and to the Retirement account for 
members aged 55 and above, who do not meet the CPF Minimum Sum. For those who have set aside the 
full CPF Minimum Sum, the excess CPF contribution will be transferred from the Medisave account to the 
Ordinary account (Ministry of Health, Singapore website 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/costs_and_financing/schemes_subisdies/medisave/Medisa











Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). The system is cost-effective and efficient as indicated 
by low overhead costs
8
 at less than 2% of total expenditure (Eiff et al., 2002). 
 
 
1.3.2 Government Health Insurance (MediShield)  
MediShield is a low cost catastrophic health insurance scheme introduced by the 
government in 1990 to help patients cope with unusually high hospitals bills. It is offered 
on an opt-out basis to all Singaporeans aged 75 years and below; and the coverage is up 
to age of 85. It operates on a co-payment and deductible system to curb moral hazard 
associated with the first dollar insurance coverage. Total annual claim is limited to 
S$50,000 with the maximum life-time claim limit being S$200,000. Annual premiums 
range from S$33 for those under 30 years of age to S$1,123 for those between 84 and 85 
years (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
9
). The premiums can be paid using 
Medisave balances or cash. Currently, about 90% of Singaporeans are covered under 
MediShield and other types of Medisave-approved insurance plans offering additional 
benefits on top of basic MediShield (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
10
). The 
government has been continuously reforming MediShield to expand its coverage and 
                                                 
 
8
 For comparison, note that the administrative expenditure in the German health insurance system is 5.4% 












benefits. It will cover up to 80% of large medical bills at ward class B2 and C level 
(Ministry of Health, Singapore website
11
). 
1.3.3 Medifund  
Medifund was established in 1993 to ensure that essential medical treatment is not denied 
to Singaporeans who face financial hardship as judged by means-testing. Thus, it acts as a 
safety net for Singaporeans who are unable to pay their hospital expenses despite 
Medisave, MediShield and the government subsidies. It was set up as an endowment fund 
with an initial capital of S$200 million; and the government injects capital into the fund 
whenever budget surpluses are available. The government utilizes interest income from 
the capital sum, which stands at S$1.7 billion (FY 2009), to finance health care of the 




The “3M” system- Medisave, MediShield and Medifund- constitutes 10% of total 
national health financing. The rest comprises employer benefits (35%), the government 
subsidies (25%), out-of-pocket spending (25%) and private insurance (5%) (Lim,2004). 
In addition to the “3M” system, a special insurance scheme for the elderly, ElderShield, 
was launched in September 2002. It covers long-term care associated with severe 
disabilities in old age. It offers a payout of S$300 per month for a maximum of 60 
months for care at home, at day rehabilitation centers or nursing homes. A new version of 
ElderShield came about in 2007 that offers an improved coverage with a payout of S$400 





ums.html (Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011) 
12
 http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/costs_and_financing/schemes_subisdies/Medifund.html 
(Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011) 
7 
 
per month for a maximum of 72 months. As with MediShield, it is an opt-out scheme and 
premiums are deducted from Medisave. The insurance scheme is only available to 
Singaporeans aged 40-69 years. As with any insurance plan, a person with pre-existing 
disability is not eligible for ElderShield coverage (Ministry of Health, Singapore 
website
13). The structure of Singapore’s health care financing system is presented in 
Figure 1.1.    




1.3.4 Government Subsidies 
The government subsidies (financed through general taxation) play a crucial role in 
financing hospital cost. About 50% of the public sector inpatient costs are subsidized 







7BUhMoZO7W%2fXm7fDMmDZvTZ9o%3d#Top (Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011) 
8 
 
(Prescott, 1999). The government subsidies are projected to exceed S$2 billion by 2012 
from S$1.5 billion in 2006 (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
14
). These subsidies 
flow from the Ministry of Health to public hospitals, and are passed on to patients 
through a multi-tier pricing structure. The government’s policy of price discrimination, 
based on different ward classes in public hospitals ranging in ascending order of comfort 
from class C, through B2 and B1 to A, allows subsidies to be targeted to poorer users. 
The government subsidizes about 80-65% (according to their ability to pay) of hospital 
costs in the lowest ward class C and 65-50% in ward class B2 while patients in higher ward 
classes such as A and B1 pay full cost or receive minimal subsidies.
15
 Table 1.1 compares 
different ward classes in public hospitals.   











A 0 1 Yes Yes Yes 
B1 20% 4 Yes Yes Yes 
B2+ 50% 5 Yes Yes No 
B2 50 – 65% 6 No No No 
C 65 – 80% 
>6 
(open ward) 
No No No 
Source: 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/dam/moh_web/Publications/Educational%20Resources/2011/EN_MOHpri
ntA4.pdf (Accessed on 6 Dec. 2011)    
 





s%20Ad1_SPH%281%29.pdf (Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011) 
15
 If an individual earns S$3200 or less a month, he or she will receive 80% subsidy for ward class C and 
65% for ward class B2. If the individual’s earning is more than S$3200 a month, then he or she will receive 
slightly less subsidy for class B2 and C wards, based on a sliding scale (Ministry of Health, Singapore 
website 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/dam/moh_web/Publications/Educational%20Resources/2010/MOH_3M%
20booklet%20%28%20English%20%29_2010.pdf Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011).  
9 
 
1.4 Ageing Population 
The International Population Report (2001) of the U.S. government listed Singapore as 
the fastest ageing population in its analysis of ageing trends across 52 countries between 
2000 and 2030. According to Chernichovsky and Markowitz (2004), ageing is a change 
in the age distribution whereby the share of the aged, however defined, in the total 
population rises. 
 
The proportion of the population aged 65 and above is projected to escalate to 18.7% in 
2030 (Report on the Ageing Population, 2006) from 8.5% in 2007 (Department of 
Statistics, Singapore, 2008). The concern over ageing of the population is not only about 
the growing number and proportion of the old but also about the changing age structure 
of the population as reflected in the “dependency ratio” (Yap, 2004). The elderly 
dependency ratio (number of the elderly aged 65 years and older per 100 persons in the 
working ages, 15-64 years) is expected to increase from 11.8% in 2007 (Department of 
Statistics, Singapore, 2008) to 29.5% in 2030 (Inter-Ministerial Committee Report on 
Ageing Population, 1999).  This dramatic demographic transition has been a result of the 
increased life expectancy at birth and a decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) to below-
replacement level (Gubhaju and Durand, 2003). The first batch of “Baby Boomers” will 
hit 65 by 2012 (Report on the Ageing Population, 2006). 
 
Since women have a longer life expectancy than men they constitute a higher proportion 
of the aged population, leading to a phenomenon called feminization of the aged 
population. Currently, women account for about 56% of the aged population in Singapore 
10 
 
and a much greater proportion of the oldest old population. In year 2000, there were 1061 
females per 1000 males in the 60-69 age group, 1173 females per 1000 males in the 70-
79 age group and 1720 females in the age group 80 and above (AWARE-TSAO 
Foundation report on Income Security for Older Women in Singapore, 2004) showing a 
worsening imbalance in the sex ratio with age.  
 
Older women are more disadvantaged compared to older men in terms of both financial 
security and age-related disabilities. Due to low paying jobs in the informal sector or 
unpaid labor such as care-giving and domestic work during their productive years, 
women often have little or no savings at all to support them in old age. Therefore, there is 
a greater tendency for older women to depend on their family for support than men. Chan 
(1999) reported, based on the 1995 National Survey of Senior Citizens in Singapore, that 
78% of females and 48% of males were dependent on their children as a main source of 
their income. Hence, issues of financial security as well as the health of the aged women 
have gained prominence in the policy debate on ageing. 
 
These demographic dynamics pose greatest challenge for social security systems and 
health systems, respectively. The government would be strained to finance ever-
increasing public spending from a shrinking tax base. According to the Report of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Health Care for the Elderly (IMCHE, 1997) “rapidly 
ageing population and the elderly’s growing health care needs are of increasing national 
concern.” Since the incidence of chronic illnesses and disabilities is higher in older age, 
the elderly utilize health care at a greater rate than the general population. For OECD 
11 
 
countries, health expenditure on those aged over 65 is around four times higher than on 
those under 65. The differential becomes six to nine times for the older groups 
(Productivity Commission, 2005). In Singapore, the aged constituted about 8.5% of the 
population (Department of Statistics, Singapore, 2008) but accounted for 28% of all 
public hospital admissions in 2007 (Yearbook of Statistics, 2008). As a result, a manifold 
increase in health care expenditure is expected to arise due to a rapidly ageing population. 
Table 1.2 shows the projections made by IMCHE, 1997, on the utilization of acute care 
services in the public sector by the aged. 
 
Table 1.2: Projected Use of Acute Care Services in the Public Sector by Older 
Persons 
 
Service 1995 2000 2010 2020 2030 
Admission to hospital 
wards 
50,205 57,600 77,500 126,900 197,300 
Specialist outpatient clinic 
new attendance 
45,045 52,200 69,600 118,100 177,900 
Accident and emergency 
department attendance 
61,488 71,300 95,000 161,100 242,700 
Govt. polyclinic 
attendance 
394,895 475,700 610,000 1,034,800 1,558,900 
Source: Report of the Inter-ministerial Committee on Health Care for the Elderly, 1997. 
 
Clearly, the projected rate of increase over 1995-2030 in admissions to public hospitals is 
dramatic (293%). In terms of public hospital expenditures, it is estimated to double from 
about $1.1 billion to nearly $2 billion over this period (Phua and Yap, 1998).
16
  The same 
                                                 
 
16
 Over the projection period (1995-2030), the total hospital expenditure is expected to increase from 
S$1.593 billion to S$2.634 billion; and private hospital expenditure from S$437 million to S$678 million 
(Phua and Yap, 1998). 
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trend is expected across all categories of acute care. In addition, the elderly are more 
likely to need long-term care because they are more at the risk of developing chronic 
debilitating diseases and severe disabilities. According to the 1999 National Survey of 
Senior Citizens, the most serious illnesses afflicting the elderly were arthritis/rheumatism 
(46%), high-blood pressure (33.2%), cataract/glaucoma (25.4%), diabetes (14.2%) and 
coronary problems (13.6%) (Teo et al., 2003).  Except cataract, all others are chronic 
diseases that need regular teatment and disease management. Moreover, a recent study 
(Ng et al., 2006) found that disability rates among the elderly are on rise. A quarter of the 
elderly aged 75 years and over had functional disability in 2004 as compared to only 
14.4% in 1985. Thus, besides the increase in health care costs stemming from higher 
acute care needs of the elderly, the growing demand for long-term care from the ageing 
population would contribute to a substantial rise in health care expenditures as well. 
1.4.1 Policy Measures in Response to Ageing Population  
The government of Singapore started to recognize the far-reaching implications of an 
ageing population as early as 1982 when it formed a high-level Committee on the 
Problems of the Aged and an Inter-Ministerial Population Committee in 1984. In 1988, 
the National Advisory Council on the Aged was formed to undertake a comprehensive 
review of the status of ageing in Singapore (Mehta, 2002). A National Policy on ageing 
was announced in 1989 under which the retirement age was raised from 55 to 60 years, 
contributions to the social security system (Central Provident Fund) were adjusted, 
recommendations for revised wage structures were adopted and several community care 
services were implemented together with a program to educate Singaporeans on the 
“correct” attitude towards older persons in the community (Teo et al., 2003). A National 
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Advisory Council on Family and Aged (NACFA) was also established in 1989. NACFA 
incorporated two working committees, the Committee on the Family (COF) and the 
Committee on the Aged (COA). 
 
It is explicit in the government’s policy that it will not take on the sole responsibility for 
care of the elderly. A major thrust is to ensure family responsibility for the elderly 
members and their wider social and community support (Phua, 1987; Teo, 1994). In line 
with this approach of the government, an important legislation called the Maintenance of 
Parents Act was introduced in 1995. This act imposes a legal obligation on children to 
maintain their parents. Furthermore, amendments to the Women’s Charter in 1996 
provided channels for the elderly parents to exercise legal action if they were victims of 
physical, mental or psychological abuse (Mehta, 2002). 
 
In 1998, the COA was replaced by the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on the Ageing 
Population, tasked to formulate a coordinated and comprehensive plan to address the 
challenging issues of Singapore’s graying population. The recommendations of the 
Advisory Councils and IMC have been translated into two Eldercare Master Plans- a 7-
year Eldercare Master Plan (FY 1994-2000) and a 5-year Eldercare Master Plan (FY 
2001-2005) (Yap, 2004). 
 
Also, in 1997 the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Health Care of the Elderly 
(IMCHE) was set up to recommend measures to ensure that health care needs of the 
elderly are met and health care remains affordable. A total of five high-level committees 
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have been appointed since 1982 to review the various issues and problems associated 
with a rapidly ageing population. The retirement age was raised further in 1999 from 60 
to 62. In 2004, the Committee on Ageing Issues (CAI) was established to build on the 
work done by previous committees.  
 
1.4.2 Financing of Health Care of the Elderly 
Health care financing policies for the elderly (as for the general population) rest on the 
government’s philosophy of personal responsibility. Besides the individual, the family is 
adjudged to have a “primary” responsibility in caring for the aged. In tandem with this 
philosophy of the government, Medisave is structured such that it can be used to pay for 
hospital expenses of immediate family members. The findings from the National Survey 
of Senior Citizens (1995) indicate that more than half (55%) of the elderly depended on 
their children’s Medisave to pay for their medical expenses while 17.9% depended on 
their own Medisave and 2% on their spouse’s Medisave. 
 
Aside from the “3M” system and ElderShield, many public programs have been 
implemented to financially help the poor elderly as well as to encourage them to lead a 
healthy life style. Some of them are briefly described below. 
(a) Medifund Silver was established in November 2007 with a capital of S$500 
million to help the needy elderly patients to pay for their medical treatment. A 
total of S$6.1 million was given out in the last two months of 2007 (The Strait 
Times, 21 Feb 2008). Unlike Medifund, which is open to all poor patients, 
Medifund Silver is only for those aged 65 years and older. 
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(b) Interim Disability Assistance Program for the Elderly (IDAPE) is a government 
assistance scheme that provides financial help to the needy and disabled elderly 
Singaporeans who are not eligible for ElderShield due to their age or pre-existing 
disabilities. For those who qualify, it pays S$100-150 a month up to 6 years.  
(c) A community screening program “Check Your Health” was launched in 2000. It 
is a screening program for diabetes, hypertension and high blood cholesterol for 
people aged 55 years and above. These conditions can lead to heart disease and 
stroke, the major causes of ill health and mortality in Singapore (Ministry of 
Health, Annual Report 2001, Singapore).  
(d) Other programs such as Comprehensive Chronic Care Program and Primary 
Care Partnership Scheme are also in place.  
1.5 The Focus of the Thesis  
As discussed above, the ageing population is expected to have a sizeable impact on the 
health sector. As highlighted by a report of IMCHE (1997) that “despite healthy living, 
health will deteriorate with age” and “the future will see more ‘very old’ elderly, with a 
different socio-economic profile and possibly different patterns of use (of health care 
services)”. In view of the significance of the issue, the present study is an attempt to 
understand health care needs of the elderly Singaporeans and financing of the health care 
of the elderly. The study focuses primarily on modeling inpatient care expenditure that 
accounts for a major proportion of health care expenditure. It utlizes data from hospital 
bills of the elderly admissions in a public hospital from Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007 in 
Singapore. Before proceeding to modeling, the second chapter engages in an exploratory 
exercise by summarizing the data by paying attention to aspects such as the average 
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hospital bill size and financing of hospitalization expenditures of the elderly and draws 
some policy implications. In the third chapter, modeling of inpatient expenditure of the 
elderly is carried out. The performance of three alternative modeling techniques that deal 
with the heavy-tailed and skewed nature of medical expense data is compared. The best 
fitting model is chosen to predict mean inpatient expenditure and to study the impact of 
various covariates such as demographic characteristics, clinical factors, outcome of 
hospitalization, length of stay, insurance status on mean expenditure. In the fourth 
chapter, the risk of facing catastrophic inpatient expenditures by the elderly Singaporeans 
is modeled. Probabilities of running into huge inpatient expenses are estimated and 
factors that increase the likelihood of such expenditures are analyzed. The models in 
these chapters can be used for out-of-sample predictions through intercept adjustments as 
the expenditure profiles shift over time provided that the slope parameters remain the 
same. The fifth chapter is devoted to determining the optimal value of deductible of the 
Singapore government’s health insurance plan using a simulation technique. Since the 
chapters are written in essay format that can easily be converted to publishable papers, 
there is repetition of certain concepts and data properties.   
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Chapter 2: How the Elderly Singaporeans Pay for their 
Hospitalization in Singapore?  
2.1 Introduction  
Total spending
 
on health care in Singapore accounts for less than 4% of the city-state's
 
GDP, the lowest in comparison to all OECD countries, yet medical services and health 
outcomes are comparable to most OECD countries (Refer Table 2.1). The government 
expenditure on health care services is only 0.9% of GDP. This outstanding performance 
of Singapore’s health care system has attracted enormous attention from academicians 
and policymakers looking for solutions to contain rising health costs in the developed 
world. Many (Massaro and Wong, 1995; Ham, 1996; Pauly, 2001; Eiff et al., 2002) 
attribute Singapore’s success to its medical savings accounts (Medisave) program which 
is considered to be the core feature of a multi-pillared health care financing system. 
Medisave is accompanied by a low-cost catastrophic illness insurance (MediShield) and a 
means-tested public safety net for the poor (Medifund). This package of the 3Ms
17
- 
Medisave, MediShield and Medifund- is, in turn, supported by the government budget 
subsidies, aimed at lowering the net price of medical care to users of health services in 
the public sector. The rest comprises employer medical benefits, private insurance and 
out-of-pocket payments.  
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 The details on Medisave, MediShield and Medifund are provided in the chapter 1.  
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Singapore 80 70 1 3 3.2 1.5 3.5 13 
Japan 83 75 1 4 14.1 2.1 8.2 27 
U.K. 79 71 3 6 3.9 2.3 8.2 22 
Sweden 81 73 2 4 2.2
 
3.3 9.2 24 
Germany 80 72 3 5 8.3 3.4 10.7 25 
Canada 81 72 3 6 3.4 1.9 9.7 18 
Australia 82 73 3 6 4.0 2.5 8.8 18 
U.S. 78 69 4 8 3.2 2.6 15.2 17 
  Source: World Health Statistics, 2008. Available at http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS08_Full.pdf  (Accessed on 30 Nov. 
2011)  
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 For all countries, the estimate of life expectancy at birth is reported for the year 2006.  
19
 For all countries, the estimate of HALE (healthy life expectancy) at birth is reported for the year 2003.  
20
 For all countries, the estimate of neonatal mortality per 1,000 live births is reported for the year 2004.  
21
 For all countries, the estimate of under 5 mortality per 1,000 live births is reported for the year 2006.  
22
 The estimate of hospital beds per 1,000 population is reported for different years (ranging from 2000 to 2007) for different countries.  
23
 The estimate of doctors per 1,000 population is reported for different years (ranging from 2000 to 2006) for different countries.  
24
 For all countries, the estimate of THE (total health expenditure) as a % of GDP is reported for the year 2005. 
25
 For all countries, the estimate of % population 60+ is reported for the year 2006. 
19 
 
Medisave scheme was introduced under the National Health Plan (NHP), formulated in 
1983, with the intention to build up financial resources to pay for medical care, especially 
in old age. The plan’s declared objectives were to secure a healthy, fit and productive 
population through active disease prevention and promotion of healthy lifestyles and to 
improve cost-efficiency in the health care system. In addition, it also aimed to meet the 
expected increase in the demand for health care that would arise from a rapidly ageing 
population which formed the basis underlying the introduction of Medisave.  
 
The proponents of medical savings accounts (MSA) argue that it checks overutilization of 
health services by creating cost-conscious consumers. Thus, it eliminates efficiency 
losses arising from moral hazard associated with a third-party pre-paid system. In this 
regard, Ham (1996) notes that the money put into the Medisave scheme belongs to the 
individuals concerned and is not pooled. This creates a sense of personal responsibility 
which provides an incentive for patients to use health services appropriately. Massaro and 
Wong (1995) find that a significantly smaller fraction of the newly created wealth went to 
new health expenditures in Singapore compared to that in Hong Kong over the period 
1984-1990. According to them, “Medisave has been a positive force in controlling costs 
in Singapore health system”. Pauly (2001) claims that, other things being equal, 
Singapore’s spending was significantly lower under the system of MSA complemented 
by catastrophic illness insurance than it would have been if the country had instituted 




Another argument advanced by the advocates of MSA (Ham, 1996; Prescott and Nichols, 
1998
26
; Phua and Yap, 1998) is that the saving approach resolves the problem of 
intergenerational transfers that a rapidly ageing society poses in a tax-financed system. A 
major concern in a pay-as-you go social security system for an ageing society is that the 
increasing tax burden on a proportionately smaller number of working people to support 
greater number of the elderly would not be sustainable in the long run. In the MSA 
system, individuals save during their working years in order to finance medical care 
needs in old age (intertemporal savings) rather than relying on uncertain taxes of future 
generations. In this context, Ham (1996) asserts that there are fewer concerns about the 
long-term financial stability of the Central Provident Fund (CPF) scheme, of which 
Medisave is one component, because contributions are designed to be sufficient to meet 
both medical care and retirement pension needs.  
 
In fact, Prescott and Nichols (1998) emphasize that the policy objective underlying 
Singapore’s MSA is not cost-containment but to mobilize non-budgetary resources to 
help pay for the increasing medical expenditure expected from a rapidly ageing 
population. This claim is further supported by Phua and Yap
27
 (1998). The authors assert 
that the implementation of Medisave in Singapore reflects the government’s objective to 
ensure that individuals’ savings form the foundation for sustainable long-term financing 
of health expenditure of rapidly growing elderly population. With this shift in public cost-
sharing, the government tax revenue can be freed to address other concerns. Furthermore, 
                                                 
 
26
 This study is based on a World Bank-IPS conference with data provided by Phua (1998) in the same 
publication.    
27
 Note that the views in Phua (1987), Phua and Yap (1998) and Phua (2001) are from the government’s 
policy committees directly whereas foreigner writers only interpret or critique the policies.   
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it is hoped that Medisave will also be able to control effective demand through the price 
mechanism (Phua, 1987)  
 
The opponents (Hsiao, 1995; Barr, 2001; Shortt, 2002; Forget et al., 2002; Hurley, 2002) 
of the system have been doubtful of the system’s ability to curtail cost. Hsiao (1995) 
concludes that MSA could not contain health care costs in Singapore which led the 
government to consider supply-side measures, for example, regulating the supply of 
hospital beds and physicians, to reduce provider-induced demand. Barr (2001) ascribes 
Singapore’s low health care spending to the strict government control of inputs and 
outputs, rationing based on wealth and to social and demographic features peculiar to 
Singapore. He argues that MSA plays a minor role in the Singapore system. The paper by 
Shortt (2002) echoes Barr’s point. It contends that Singapore’s MSA system (the 
demand-side approach) is not effective in controlling health care costs without the 
supply-side regulations. Both Forget et al. (2002) and Hurley (2002) conclude that MSAs 
will not control expenditure in Canada’s publicly-financed health care system. Instead, 
they will drive up costs by increasing spending on the healthiest members of the 
population.  
 
Moreover, the MSA system has been criticized for promoting inequities in the society.   
Barr (2001) claims that, “for most of the population, the cost of moving outside the 
parameters set by the 3Ms in Singapore is prohibitive. Chronically sick, the working poor 
and the elderly, particularly old women, are seriously disadvantaged”. This assertion is 
reinforced by Shortt (2002) who notes that Medisave, especially, when coupled with tax 
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advantages benefits the healthy and wealthy while leaving the sick either to seek higher 
cost comprehensive insurance or to bear increased out-of-pocket expenses. The author 
asserts that “health care costs in Singapore often cannot be met by elderly people, 
especially elderly widows who were never employed outside the home, and poor people”. 
In the same vein, Asher and Nandy (2006) argue that the tax treatment of Medisave is 
likely to exacerbate the regressive nature of the health care financing system in 
Singapore.  The income tax exemption of contributions, interest income and withdrawals 
from Medisave does not benefit two-third of the labor force that does not pay income tax.  
 
It should be noted that the claims by Barr (2001) and Shortt (2002) are made in absence 
of any data which cast doubt on their reliability. In fact, the lack of primary data has been 
an issue in Singapore case. The paper by Chia and Tsui (2005) deserves a special mention 
in this regard since it uses survey results of a longitudinal study of transition in health and 
wealth of the elderly to assess the adequacy of Medisave to finance medical expenses of 
the elderly over the post-retirement period. The authors estimate the present value of 
lifetime health care expenses (PVHE) of Singaporeans males and females upon 
retirement. Their results show that the minimum Medisave sum
28
 would be adequate for 
both the less well-off male and female elderly at 4% medical cost growth and 4% or 
higher discount rate. It is also adequate for better-off male elderly but not so for better-off 
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 Minimum Medisave sum is a decreed minimum amount that a CPF account holder needs to retain in 
his/her Medisave account whenever he/she makes a withdrawal of CPF savings at age of 55 or more. The 
rationale behind Minimum Medisave Sum is to ensure enough medical savings to meet future health care 
expenses. The Medisave Minimum Sum from 1 July 2011 is S$36,000 and is adjusted every July of the 
year (Ministry of Health, Singapore website 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/costs_and_financing/schemes_subisdies/medisave/Medisa
ve_Contributions.html Accessed on 12 Dec. 2011).  
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female elderly. The shortfall is in range of 34-75% of the minimum sum and becomes 
more severe when medical expense grows at higher rates.  
  
In the present essay, based on the one-year data from hospital bills of the elderly in 
Singapore, we examine inpatient expenditure of the elderly and financing of inpatient 
expenditure to provide insight into the following issues (a) the role played by the 
government subsidies; (b) proportion of hospital bill covered by MSA; (c) extent to 
which the government insurance is able to protect the elderly against catastrophic 
expenditure; (d) financial burden of illness on the elderly as reflected in out-of-pocket 
payment; and (e) support provided by family in sharing the cost of illness.  
 
It is important to emphasize that we do not intend to test any of the claims made by 
various authors cited above. Furthermore, we do not claim to assess the performance of 
Singapore’s health care financing system based on the one-year inpatient data from a 
public hospital. This chapter is just an exploratory exercise to understand how the elderly 
offset their hospital bills.  
 
In what follows, data is described in Section 2.2. Results and analysis are presented in 
Section 2.3 which consists of the following subsections: Subsection 2.3.1 presents results 
on the government subsidies, Subsection 2.3.2 on inpatient expenditure and Subsection 
2.3.3 on the length of stay. Means of financing of inpatient expenditure of the elderly are 
examined in Subsection 2.3.4. Section 2.4 concludes this essay and highlights the main 
limitations.   
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2.2 Description of Data  
The data is extracted from hospital bills of the elderly (64 and over) admitted in 
Singapore General Hospital (SGH) from Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007. Established in 1821, SGH 
is Singapore’s biggest and oldest tertiary acute public hospital. It operates on not-for-
profit basis and is a member of the SingHealth (Singapore Health Services) group, an 
integrated healthcare delivery network comprising hospitals, national specialty centers 
and polyclinics (SGH website
29
). The charges in SGH (and other Singapore’s public 
hospitals) are set by the Ministry of Health that compiles a complete list of charges 
including doctors’ fees for a comprehensive range of procedures at public hospitals.  
The data set contains information on inpatient’s characteristics such as age, gender, 
length of stay, diagnoses (primary and secondary), outcome of hospitalization, itemized 
inpatient expenses and modes of financing. The total number of hospitalization episodes 
of the elderly recorded during the period is 31,246. After dropping the non-resident cases 
and cases with missing values, the sample size used for analysis is 30,192 hospitalization 
episodes (of 18,935 elderly patients). The median age of a patient in our sample is 74.6 
years. Both sexes are well represented in the sample with 52% females and 48% males. 
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 http://www.sgh.com.sg/about-us/more-about-sgh/pages/aboutus.aspx  (Accessed on 30 Nov. 2011) 
25 
 
2.3 Results and Analysis 
2.3.1 Government Subsidies 
The data shows that the government subsidy that a patient receives, on average, covers 
60% of the total charges of a hospitalization episode. As noted earlier, the government 
subsidies are implemented through a system of ward class in public hospitals with ward C 
receiving the maximum subsidy that ranges between 65 to 80% of the total charges and 
ward A gets zero subsidy. Our findings are consistent with what is expected. The 
government subsidy amounts to 72.4% of the total charges in ward C, 64.3% in ward B2, 
53.6% in ward B2+, 13.6% in ward B1 and 0.3% in ward A (See figure 2.1). 






2.3.2 Inpatient Expenditure 
a. Gross Inpatient Expenditure 
The gross inpatient expenditure refers to the total charges of a hospital admission, 
without taking into account the government subsidies and taxes. The mean gross inpatient 
expenditure per hospitalization episode of the elderly Singaporean is S$5,778 and the 
median is S$3,104.
30
 The mean gross expenditure in ward A is 1.3 times the mean gross 
expenditure in ward C and 1.4 times ward B2 (Refer Table 2.2). Surprisingly, the 
maximum gross expenditure is incurred in ward B2.  
 
b. Net Inpatient Expenditure 
The net inpatient expenditure refers to the final amount payable upon discharge from the 
hospital. It is arrived from the gross inpatient expenditure by subtracting the government 
subsidy and adding the goods and services tax.
31
 The mean net expenditure of a 
hospitalization episode of the elderly Singaporean is S$2,320. There is a huge variation in 
expenditure across ward classes owing to the government subsidies. The large jump in 
the bill size for wards A and B over C is immediately noticeable from Table 2.3 that 
presents the distribution of the net inpatient expenditure in different ward classes. The 
unsubsidized ward A bill is approximately 5.5 times the highly subsidized ward C bill 
and 4.5 times ward B2 bill. Ward B2+ was 1.6 times more expensive and B2 was only 
1.2 times more expensive than C. This explains the popularity of ward B2 as reflected by 
the largest sample size for ward B2 in the Table 2.3. Note that the maximum net inpatient 
expenditure was incurred in ward class A.  
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 All dollar amounts are in 2007 Singapore dollar. 
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 The rate for the goods and services tax (GST) in Singapore in year 2007 was 7%.   
27 
 
The median expenditure is lower than the mean expenditure (S$1,087 versus S$2,320) 
which indicates the skewed distribution of health care expenditure. In fact, the most 
expensive 10% of episodes account for 47.9% of total expenditure and the top 1% of 
episodes about 13.6% of total expenditure.  
 




























A 1,395 7,759 3,939 17,428 21,896 46,469 319 287,902 
B1 2,324 7,053 3,901 15,704 19,970 36,440 256 144,735 
B2+ 822 5,412 4,014 11,042 15,532 26,944 256 38,479 
B2 15,260 5,378 2,822 12,704 17,393 32,666 226 308,627 
C 10,391 5,843 3,181 13,361 18,490 37,554 186 136,127 
Total 30,192 5,778 3,104 13,517 18,222 35,519 186 308,627 
 
 




























A 1,395 8,108 4,180 18,326 23,266 48,793 341 207,741 
B1 2,324 6,560 3,574 14,819 18,404 33,646 213 136,754 
B2+ 822 2,305 1,804 4,074 5,681 10,851 135 21,091 
B2 15,260 1,727 986 3,989 5,257 10,083 68 95,615 
C 10,391 1,466 842 3,257 4,431 9,004 38 38,721 
Total 30,192 2,320 1,087 4,778 8,133 19,126 38 207,741 
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2.3.2 Length of Stay (LOS) 
The mean LOS is around 7.3 days with LOS in ward C significantly
32
 higher than in 
other wards (A, B1 and B2). However, wards A, B1 and B2 seem to have no significant 
difference in the LOS (Refer Table 2.4 on distribution of the LOS across different ward 
classes). The higher LOS in ward class C could be due to a combination of factors (a) 
generous government subsidies lower the effective price of stay in ward C and thus, 
incentivizes patients to stay longer; (b) the general health of the low-income stratum of 
the society is poor; (c) Long-staying patients with large bills opt to downgrade to ward C.  
 
The distribution of LOS is also skewed as is evident from Table 2.4. The top 10% of 
episodes made up 42% of total inpatient days and top 1% about 10% of days.    
 




















A 6.9 4 15 25 53 
B1 6.4 4 13 20 39 
B2+ 5.4 3 11 18 36 
B2 6.7 4 15 22 44 
C 8.6 5 19 28 57 
Total 7.3 4 16 24 49 
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 5% level of significance is chosen. 
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2.3.4 Financing of Inpatient Expenditure
33
  
Having examined the inpatient expenditure and LOS, we now study how the net inpatient 
expenditure is financed. The pie chart in Figure 2.2 shows the shares of different means 
of financing net inpatient expenditure. MSA of the patient and family member, together, 
offset about 68% of the subsidized hospital bill. The contribution of insurance (both the 
government and private) is fairly small, covering only 15% of the subsidized bill. Out-of-
pocket payment comprises 6.3% of the subsidized bill. Each component is analyzed in 
detail below.  
 
Figure 2.2: Shares of Means of Financing Net Inpatient Expenditure 
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 We choose to look at how the net inpatient expenditure is financed by the elderly because that is the final 
amount to be paid. Note that net inpatient expenditure = gross inpatient expenditure - government subsidies 












MSA of patient MSA of family members
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a. Medical Savings Account of the Patient (Medisave) 
In our sample, 55% of the elderly use Medisave to pay for hospitalization. The role of 
Medisave towards financing inpatient expenses of the elderly is rather modest. This stems 
partially from the fact that the present cohort of the elderly did not have enough working 
years left to build up sufficient Medisave balances after the scheme was launched in 
1984. As a result Medisave balances of a majority of the elderly fall short of the 
minimum sum stipulated by the government. For example, in 2005, average Medisave 
balance of 65 years and older was S$5,300 while the minimum sum was S$27,500 
(Ministry of Health, Singapore website
34
). Furthermore, due to higher medical needs of 
the elderly, there has been a greater draw-down of their Medisave balances but without 
matching replenishment.  
 
More males than females (66% versus 46%) use Medisave to offset their medical bills. 
The gender differential in the Medisave utilization can be explained by the fact that 
women, due to low paying jobs in informal sector or unpaid labor such as care-giving and 
domestic work during their productive years, could accumulate less Medisave balances 
compared to their male counterpart.   
 
For the elderly who use Medisave, 68% of expenses of a hospitalization episode are paid 
from Medisave. The proportion is higher (72%) for lower ward classes B2 and C than for 
higher ward classes A and B1 (31%).  





and_assistance_to_pay_for_Medishield_premiums.html (Accessed on 30 Nov. 2011) 
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b. Health Insurance 
 
Government Health Insurance (MediShield) 
Only 22% of the elderly have payout from MediShield. Older elderly ( 80 years) have 
very poor payout (4.4%) while younger elderly (64-74 years) fare a bit better (28.9%). 
(Refer Figure 2.3)  
 




There could be several reasons why MediShield plays a negligible role in financing of 
hospitalization expenses of the elderly, especially older elderly. First, the maximum entry 
age of MediShield is 75 years though the coverage is up to 85 years. Second, relatively 
high premiums for older elderly ( 80 years) compared to younger elderly (< 80 years). 
The premium jumps from S$524 for 76-78 years and S$615 for 79-80 years to S$1,087 
32 
 
for 81-83 years and S$1,123 for 84-85 years (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
35
). 
Lastly, the deductible is higher for older elderly. For ward class C, the deductible is 
S$1,000 for 80 years and below while it is S$2,000 for 81-85 years ((Ministry of Health, 
Singapore website).   
  
For those who have payout from MediShield, it finances 52% of the bill of a 
hospitalization episode with vast differences across wards. The proportion of the bill 
covered in wards C and B2 is about 4 times higher than in wards A and B1 wards (Refer 
Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: Percentage of Bill Covered by MediShield for Hospitalization Episodes 













Private Health Insurance  
Private health insurance is even less popular, just 8% of the elderly have payout from it. 
Older elderly have almost no private insurance. Maximum entry age between 65 and 75 
years, high premiums, high deductible and pre-existing conditions are possible reasons 
behind the poor uptake of private insurance. For those who have payout from private 
insurance, it finances about 62% of the expenses of a hospitalization episode.  
 
Figure 2.5 presents a comparison of different means of financing of hospitalization 
episodes with payout from insurance (both the government and private insurance) and of 
episodes without any payout.  
 
Figure 2.5: Hospitalization Episodes with Payout from Insurance versus 






As expected, for episodes which are not covered by insurance, a much larger fraction of 
the bill is offset from the patient’s MSA and family members’ MSA compared to 
episodes with payout from insurance (Patient’s MSA: 35.8% versus 19%; Family 
members’ MSA: 45.4% versus 17.7%). Furthermore, out-of-pocket payment is almost 
double for episodes without any insurance payout compared to episodes with insurance 
payout.  
 
Insurance and Catastrophic Expenditures 
The motivation underlying the introduction of MediShield is to protect individuals 
against catastrophic health expenses. In fact, it has been shown that the insurance 
mechanism that protects against high cost-low probability health shocks is welfare 
improving. The question that we address now is how well MediShield protects the elderly 
against high (and perhaps, catastrophic) expenses, which is a story about the tail of the 
distribution. Therefore, in this subsection, we focus on the top decile of inpatient 
expenditure distribution and examine the extent to which insurance finances the inpatient 
expenditure. For the most expensive 10% of episodes with payout from MediShield, it 
covers, on average, 40% of hospitalization expenses. There is a sharp variation across 
wards in the proportion of the bill financed by MediShield- nearly 68% is covered in 
ward class C as against 11% in ward class A. Private health insurance offsets a higher 
fraction (61%) of hospitalization cost in the top decile than MediShield. Moreover, 
variation across wards is not as marked as in case of MediShield- 78% of the bill is 






Medifund assistance is only for admissions in ward classes B2 and C. A very small 
percentage of hospitalization episodes receive Medifund assistance- only 0.19% in ward 
B2 and 2.5% in ward C. In fact, less than 1% of the elderly are helped by Medifund in 
our sample. This low proportion is a consequence of the government policy to restrict 
Medifund’s role as a last-resort safety net. For those who obtained aid, about three-
quarter of expenses of a hospitalization episode are paid. The proportions are 51% and 
78% for wards B2 and C, respectively. 
 
d. Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Payment 
Surprisingly, OOP payment constitutes a small percentage of the hospital bill. In the 
entire sample, OOP payment
36
 is approximately 6% of the bill and for the top decile, 
about 14%. In fact, only 23% of the elderly paid a certain fraction of the bill out-of-
pocket and for these elderly, annual OOP payment amounts to 8% of the average annual 
income of the household with main income earner 65 years or older.
37
 For inpatient 
episodes involving OOP payment, 37% of the bill is paid from out-of-pocket. 
 
 
e. Medical Savings Account of a Family Member  
 
What is perplexing is that, despite relatively small contributions of the elderly’s MSA and 
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 In interpreting this statistics, it is important to bear in mind that the measure of OOP payment used here 
does not include insurance premiums. Thus, OOP payment is underestimated to that extent. 
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insurance in financing hospitalization expenses, out-of-pocket payment is considerably 
small. The answer to this puzzle lies in this unique feature of Singapore’s health care 
financing system wherein MSA can be used to pay for hospitalization of immediate 
family members. This is in accord with the government’s initiative to encourage family 
responsibility in caring for the aged.
38
 In fact, medical savings of children have become 
an important source of financing of health care of the aged parents. In the present case, 
51% of the elderly have their hospital bills paid from their family members' MSA. More 
females (64%) than males (38%) tap on family members’ medical savings as they have 
lower MSA balances of their own and lower insurance coverage compared to males. For 
same reasons, older elderly (56%) are more dependent on family than younger elderly 
(49%). About 73% of cost of an inpatient episode is borne out of family members’ MSA 
for the dependent elderly. Figure 2.6 indicates that the elderly who are supported by their 
children have very little of their own medical savings. For the independent elderly, 59% 
of expenses of a hospitalization episode are paid from their own MSA compared to only 
4% for the dependent elderly. The share of OOP payment in financing a hospitalization 
episode is higher for the elderly without family support than the elderly with family 
support (8.9% versus 3.8%). Moreover, the elderly without family support requires more 
assistance from Medifund to pay their hospital bills than the elderly with family support 
(1.3% versus 0.2%).      
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 60% of the elderly depend on their children’s MSA to pay for their medical expenses (Ministry of 
Health, Singapore, website 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/pressRoom/Parliamentary_QA/2005/Medisave_balances_






Figure 2.6: Hospitalization Episodes with Payment from Family Members’ MSA 
versus Hospitalization Episodes without any such Payment: A Comparison of 




2.4 Concluding Remarks and Limitations 
This essay examines how the elderly Singaporeans pay their hospital bills by analyzing 
the data from the hospital admissions of the elderly in a public hospital. The findings of 
the study shed light on the issues pertinent to health care financing of the elderly which 
has assumed critical importance against the backdrop of a rapidly ageing population. 
First, the study highlights the vital role played by the government subsidies in ensuring 
the affordability of basic medical care in Singapore because a majority of the elderly 
admissions are in the subsidized wards (B2 and C) where the average cost is between 50-
20% of the cost in the private ward (A). Second, it finds out that the elderly do not have 
sufficient Medisave balances to be able to meet their hospitalization expenses. The 
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problem is compounded by the lack of insurance coverage. As a result, a large percentage 
of the elderly draw upon their children’s medical savings to pay for their health care 
expenses. This fits in with the nation’s philosophy of giving primacy to family in caring 
for the elderly besides the emphasis on personal responsibility.  
 
The nation is likely to face increasing challenges in the near future as the elderly 
population increases in proportion with a larger political voice. With a rapidly ageing 
population, the government would be strained to finance increasing health subsidies from 
a shrinking tax base. Moreover, there would be greater demand on children’s Medisave 
when they themselves grow old and face rising personal medical expenses, for example, 
Medisave account-holder 60 years old with an elderly dependent 85 years old. This 
problem is particularly relevant to the present generation of the elderly who do not have 
the financial resources that will be available to younger generation with much greater 
CPF savings. Consequently, they are financially dependent on their children for health 
care and other retirement needs which further implies that the present cohort of wage-
earners not only have to save for their own old age but also have to provide for the 
elderly dependents without sufficient personal savings (Phua, 2001; Teo et al., 2003). 
However, the future generations of the elderly are expected to have accumulated enough 
Medisave savings, and together with MediShield coverage will have sufficient financial 
resources to meet the cost of health care.    
 
The measures towards expanding insurance coverage of the elderly can help to ameliorate 
the financing problems that an ageing population poses. One way forward is by making 
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MediShield universal and compulsory. If MediShield is to remain voluntary, it should be 
made more attractive for the elderly to encourage greater uptake. Some suggestions in 
that regard are as follows. Premiums could be lowered for the elderly, especially the older 
ones (>80 years). One way to do that is to replace existing risk-adjusted premiums of 
MediShield with a MediShield tax, a small fixed percentage of income, with some caps 
and provisions. This would involve cross-subsidization from younger to older members. 
Second, the usefulness of co-payments for a catastrophic insurance as cost-sharing 
mechanisms to check overutilization of health care has been questioned (Phua and Yup, 
1998). It is argued that, unlike the case of comprehensive insurance, the likelihood of 
moral hazard emanating from the demand side is less for catastrophic insurance. Since 
catastrophic care is mostly supplier-driven, there should be checks and controls on the 
supply side to curb the moral hazard problem. Third, the annual and life-time claim limits 
of MediShield work contrary to the principle of the insurance, that is, to protect against 
financial catastrophe, as they act to cut-off payment when it is most needed (Keeler et al., 
1974). Rather, there should be a stop-loss provision, that is, a maximum amount that any 
individual must pay; above that amount, the insurance plan pays for everything. 
However, this may result in sharp increases in insurance premiums if the insurance 
operates on an actuarially fair basis. An alternative proposal is for the government to 
direct public hospitals to absorb medical costs of patients if they exceed a certain limit. In 
this way the out-of-pocket spending by patients can be capped just like a stop-loss 
provision in insurance plans. However, the cost in this case would be borne by hospitals 
and thus, would not be reflected in higher insurance premiums. Fourth, insurance 
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coverage and claim rules should be made simpler. Besides these measures, there should 
be efforts to educate and encourage the elderly to get insurance coverage.  
 
It is important to highlight that greater reliance on health insurance as a financing 
mechanism would create greater need to monitor cost and quality. Thus, strengthening 
utilization review and medical audit should be done in tandem with measures to achieve 
expanded insurance coverage. In a nutshell, there should be the right incentives in place 
to encourage doctors and patients to utilize health care at the optimum level. 
 
An interesting issue that needs to be addressed is how the expansion of insurance in a 
family-oriented system like Singapore’s, where family is considered to be the first line of 
support for the elderly, impacts on filial piety. This can be topic for future research. 
Another issue that needs some deliberation is whether Medisave withdrawal limits should 
be set higher for the elderly than the general population to account for their higher 
medical costs (Phua and Yap, 1998). 
 
Before we end, we want to acknowledge that, like any other study, our study is not free 
from caveats. The data, though quite comprehensive, is still limited in certain aspects. 
The first regards the representation of our sample. Although SGH is Singapore’s largest 
public hospital, we cannot claim that our sample is a true representation of hospital 
admissions of Singapore’s elderly as we lack data on the elderly who were admitted in 
other public and private hospitals. Second, the one-year data is not sufficient for 
investigating how adequate medical savings accounts are in financing lifetime 
hospitalization needs of the elderly since it is not possible to separate people who may 
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have had frequent hospital admissions in the last couple of years from those who just had 
a one-off admission. Third, expenses on outpatient services and long-term care are not 
recorded which prevents us from measuring total medical expenses incurred by the 
elderly. Lastly, the data does not capture any indicator of the economic status of the 
elderly which limits our ability to comment on the equitability of Singapore’s health care 
financing system. The assessment of equity in financing of health care requires some 





Chapter 3: Modeling Skewed and Heavy-Tailed Inpatient 
Expenditure of the Elderly in Singapore 
3.1 Introduction 
There is little published literature that analyzes inpatient expenditures of Singapore’s 
ageing population. In this study, we model inpatient expenditure of the elderly in 
Singapore and examine the impact of inpatient’s characteristics such as patient’s 
demographics, survival status, insurance status, length of stay and other clinical factors 
on expenditure.   
 
Medical expense data typically display a number of characteristics that render standard 
modeling techniques inappropriate. These characteristics include (a) non-negative values; 
(b) a significant proportion of zero values in the population corresponding to a large 
percentage of individuals who have no medical expenses; and (c) a positively skewed 
distribution with non-constant variance
39
 of non-zero values. A robust modeling 
technique must address these problems in order to draw valid statistical inference.  
 
Several methods for modeling medical expense data have been proposed in the literature.  
Traditionally, a two-part model has been used to model medical expense data that include 
individuals with zero medical expense. Part 1 of such a model deals with the mass at zero 
by estimating the probability of observing a positive expense by a logit or probit model 
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 Non-constant variance means that there tends to be more variability among individuals’ expenses when 
those expenses are large than when they are small (Blough et al., 1999)   
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followed by part 2 of the model that estimates the level of positive expense (conditional 
on non-zero expense) by ordinary least square regression.  
 
The dependent variable in part 2 of the model is log-transformed to reduce (if not 
completely eliminate) skewness. Predictions from these models must be retransformed to 
obtain estimates on the original scale. However, in doing so, one may face the problem of 
retransformation bias, that is, unbiased and consistent quantities on the transformed scale 
do not retransform into unbiased or consistent quantities on the original scale. For 
example, an incorrect normality assumption about the true error distribution can lead to 
inconsistent estimates of expected response on the original scale.
40
 Duan (1983) proposes 
a non-parametric retransformation method termed as “smearing estimate” which is free 
from distributional assumptions on the error distribution. The estimate is shown to be 
consistent under mild regularity conditions and more efficient relative to parametric 
estimates.       
 
It is important to highlight that even the smearing estimate can provide a biased estimate 
of the expected response on the original scale in the presence of heteroscedasticity on the 
log scale (Duan, 1983; Manning 1998). To avoid difficulties of retransformation 
associated with ordinary regression, generalized linear modeling has been suggested as an 
alternative as it explicitly takes into account non-constant variance while retaining the 
original scale of the data. A pioneering paper by Blough et al. (1999) presents the 
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 There is a vast literature that looks at the problem of estimating the original scale expectation under the 
assumption of normally distributed error (Neyman and Scott, 1960; Meulenberg, 1965; Bradu and  




generalized linear model (GLM) approach to model medical expense distribution of 
individuals with positive expenses. The model is estimated using a quasi-likelihood 
technique that relaxes distributional assumptions. The application of the modeling 
technique is illustrated using medical expense data from Washington State employees 
and their dependents.   
 
After the introduction of the GLM approach, there have been a series of papers 
comparing the performance of alternative techniques of modeling medical expense data. 
Using simulated data that capture various violations of the model assumptions, Manning 
and Mullahy (2001) compare the performance of least-square estimators for the ln(y) and 
GLM estimators. The authors conclude that no single estimator is best under all 
conditions. Depending on the characteristics of the data and the research question, each 
of them could be the best estimator under certain circumstances. They provide a model 
selection criterion to choose among alternative estimators. 
 
In another paper (Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004), the performance of eight alternative 
estimators is evaluated including OLS and GLM estimators and one- and two-part 
models, in predicting Medicare costs, conditional on the demographic conditions, self-
reported health status and health conditions of the elderly in the U.S. The results indicate 
that one-part GLMs should be the first choice for modeling health care costs and use 
before proceeding to two-part GLMs or OLS models with log-transformed dependent 
variable. One-part GLMs present many advantages over two-part OLS models as they 
allow for heteroscedasticity and accommodate zero observations without much difficulty 
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besides being easier to estimate than two-part OLS models. However, if one is interested 
in modeling probability of non-zero use per se then one should straightaway employ two-
part GLMs. The researcher could use two-part transformed OLS model if the residuals 
are homoscedastic on the transformed scale or there are ways to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. If there are no direct ways to correct for heteroscedasticity, then using 
separate smearing factors for different parts of distribution would yield better results for 
OLS models. 
 
Manning et al. (2005) estimate the generalized gamma model that provides nested 
comparisons of standard alternative estimators- OLS with a normal error, OLS for the 
lognormal, the standard gamma and exponential with a log link, and the weibull- because 
these can be treated as special cases of the generalized gamma model. Moreover, if none 
of the standard estimators are appropriate for the data, then the generalized gamma 
regression provides an alternative estimator that will be more efficient because it better 
approximates the distribution than the more restrictive estimators.         
 
The GLM approach has its own limitations. The GLM estimates, though unbiased, could 
be quite imprecise if the log-scale error was symmetric but heavy tailed or if the log-scale 
error variance is greater than one (Manning and Mullahy, 2001 and Manning et al., 
2005). Furthermore, it may be difficult to identify the link and variance function, a priori 
(Blough et al., 1999; Manning and Mullahy, 2001). An extension of the GLM to estimate 
the link and variance function simultaneously with regression coefficients is proposed by 




The rest of the essay is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, the objective of the essay is 
stated followed by the estimation technique in Section 3.3. The data is described in 
Section 3.4 and an overview of model selection criterion is presented in Section 3.5. 
Estimation results are given in Section 3.6, split-sample cross validation exercise is 
carried out in Section 3.7 and Section 3.8 compares the performance of alternative 
models. Section 3.9 tabulates marginal and incremental effects of various covariates on 
expected inpatient expenditure. Section 3.10 concludes.   
3.2 Objective 
The objective of the essay is two-fold: first, to model mean inpatient expenditures 
incurred by the elderly Singaporeans as a function of a set of covariates and to make 
inference about different functionals of the mean used to measure the effects of the 
covariates; second, to gain methodological insight from this practical exercise. The data 
on inpatient expenditures of the elderly who, at least, had one hospitalization episode in 
2007 in a public hospital is analyzed. Owing to the nature of the data, we focus on the 
second part of the so-called two-part model, that is, on modeling positive hospitalization 
expenses.
41
 The performance of alternative models is compared and the best fitting model 
is chosen to study the impact of various covariates such as demographic characteristics, 
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 Since we do not have the data on individuals with zero expenditure, we cannot model the selection into 
the hospital admission. A selection equation not only could correct any selection bias for hospital 
expenditure, but also could shed light on the characteristics of those who were not in the hospital in that 
year.      
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clinical factors, outcome of hospitalization, length of stay, insurance status on mean 
expenditure. 
 
3.3 Modeling Techniques  
Each of the modeling techniques is described below.  
3.3.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) on ln(Yi) Model  
A common modeling approach to skewed data is to use ordinary least squares (or a 
variant) on a log-transformed dependent variable. The model, adapted from Manning 
(1998) and Manning and Mullahy (2001), is as follows. 
Model  
nixY iii ,,2,1)ln( 

                                                        (3.1) 
where Yi is the response variable, xi = (Xi1, …, Xik) is a (k  1) vector of covariates that 
may include the intercept. β is a (k  1) vector of regression parameters and εi is the 
disturbance term. It is assumed that E(εi) = 0 and E(εiXij) = 0,  j = 1, 2, …, k. The error 
term εi need not necessarily be i.i.d.   
Model (3.1) provides 

 iii xxYE ))|(ln( . 
As aforementioned, estimates based on logged models must be retransformed to obtain 
estimates on the original scale, that is, translate E(ln(Yi|xi)) into ln(E(Yi|xi)) by 
retransformation. The expectation of Yi, assuming xi is non-stochastic, is given as 
follows:  
)()|( ii eEexYE xii
                                                                                         (3.2) 
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Note that the expectation of Yi is not just the exponential of the expectation of ln(Yi). It 
has an additional term ).( ieE   
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ii                                                                                   (3.4) 
The integral in (3.4) can be treated as a constant if the error term is homoscedastic in xi 
and any other variables zi. Two cases follow depending upon whether the error term is 
normally distributed or not.       
(a) If  εi is normally distributed N(0, σ
2
ε ), then  
    
25.0
)|( 
  ixii exYE   (3.5) 
(b) If εi is not normally distributed, but is i.i.d., or if  ie
  has constant mean and 
variance, then  
         

 ixii esxYE .)|(         
(3.6) 
where )( ieEs
  is the Duan’s non-parametric smearing factor. Duan (1983) shows that 
the estimated residual can be substituted for error term to get a consistent estimate of the 
smearing factor.  
However, if the error term is heteroscedastic in xi, i.e., )( ieE

 is some function f (xi), 
then  
 ixiii exfxYE .)()|(  (3.7) 
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or, equivalently, ))(ln())|(ln( iiii xfxxYE 

    
and in the lognormal case, )(5.0))|(ln( 2 iiii xxxYE  

  (3.8) 
where 
2
(xi) in Eq. (3.8) denotes error variance as a function of xi on the log scale. 
  
It is clear from Eq. (3.8) that the expectation of Yi depends on the variance and therefore, 
on heteroscedasticity on the log scale. The presence of heteroscedasticity on the log scale 
implies that the exponentiated log-scale prediction (
ixes . ) provides a biased estimate of 
the E(Yi|xi), and is biased in a way that depends on xi if the s is the homoscedastic 
smearing factor. This bias can be eliminated by including an estimate of the error 
variance 
2
(xi), if the error is lognormal, or of )|( ixeE i
  in general case (Manning and 
Mullahy, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, in heteroscedastic case, the slope of the expected value of Yi with respect to 



























This derivative should be used in the calculation of elasticity of the mean response 
(Manning, 1998).  
 
To sum up, if the error term is heteroscedastic on the log scale, then one must use 
information on the nature of heteroscedasticity to obtain an unbiased estimate of the 
retransformation factor. However, the nature of heteroscedasticity is seldom known. 
50 
 
Alternatively, one can employ generalized linear models (GLM) which retain the original 
scale of variables and hence, the problem of retransformation does not arise. We explain 
the GLM modeling in the next section. 
 
3.3.2 Generalized Linear Model (GLM) 
An approach which has become more popular recently is the GLM modeling. It obviates 
the need to transform data; rather it represents reparameterization of the model that 
retains the original scale of the response variable. The model, adapted from Blough et al. 
(1999) and Manning and Mullahy (2001), is presented below. 
Model 
A GLM is an extension of traditional linear model. There are three components in the 
GLM.  
(a) The linear component as in the traditional linear model:  


 ii x                                                                                                   (3.9) 
 
(b) A monotonic, differentiable link function g which relates expected value of Yi  to 
the linear component: 
);()|())|((  iiiiii xxYEorxxYEg 

                                   (3.10) 




(c) The response variables Y1, Y2, …,Yn are independent, each having a probability 
distribution from an exponential family. This implies that the variance depends on 
the mean by way of the variance function:   
   ));(()|var(  iiii xhxYV                                                                                  
where κ is a constant known as the dispersion parameter. More generally, this 
conditional mean-variance relationship can be represented by power-proportional 
variance function: 
,));(()|var(  iii xxY   
where λ must be finite and non-negative.
 
(3.11)                                                               
 If λ = 0, the variance is constant and we get the Gaussian non-linear least square 
(NLLS) model. 
 If λ = 1, the variance is proportional to the mean and we get a “Poisson-like” 
model because the variance function for the Poisson distribution takes this form.  
 If λ = 2, the standard deviation is proportional to the mean and we get a 
“Gamma-like” model because a gamma scale family, or indeed any scale 
family, has a variance function of this form.    
 If λ = 3, we get the inverse Gaussian (or Wald) distribution. 
Note that the GLM residuals need not take these distributional forms and λ need not be an 
integer. In health care cost modeling, log link is commonly chosen, that is, 


 iii xxYE ))|(ln(  or 
 ixii exYE )|(  
 
Estimation 
Quasi-likelihood technique is employed to estimate parameters of interest k ,...,, 21 .  
The estimation technique allows us to model the response variable in a regression context 
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without specifying its distribution. We only need to specify the link and variance 
functions to estimate regression coefficients. Although the link and variance functions 
determine a theoretical likelihood, the likelihood itself is not specified so fewer 
assumptions are required for estimation and inference. 
 
Estimation of the conditional mean parameters k ,...,, 21  proceeds by maximizing 
quasi-likelihood function. The solution to the following quasi-score equations gives
k























    
Note that Vi is assumed to be a function of the mean function );(  ix , not of individual 
covariates Xij directly. 
 
Next, we explain a test proposed by Manning and Mullahy (2001) termed as “Modified 
Park Test” to aid in the selection of the appropriate variance function for the GLM model.      
 
Modified Park Test  
Manning and Mullahy (2001) suggested a modified version of the Park test as a guide to 
select the variance function in the GLM specification. The original Park test (Park, 1966) 
is used to test for heteroscedasticity for a particular variable.  In the original Park test, the 
log of the residual squared (on the scale of the analysis) is regressed on some factor z 
known to cause heteroscedasticity in the error on the scale of the analysis. In the modified 
Park test, residuals and predictions on the original-scale for Yi are used to estimate and 
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test a very specific form of heteroscedasticity- one where the original-scale variance is a 
power function of the original-scale mean function. To carry out the test, regress by OLS 
the log of original-scale residual squared from provisional model (GLM or log-
transformed OLS) on the log of the original-scale prediction from the same model, that is,   
iiii YYY   )
ˆln()ˆln( 2                                                                             (3.12) 
where ˆˆ

 ixi eY  from one of the GLM specifications
42
 or )(ˆ5.0




  from the 
lognormal specification. The estimate of the coefficient λ on the log of the original-scale 
prediction indicates which GLM model to employ if the GLM option is chosen.   
 
The GLM approach offers some advantages over log-transformed OLS. First, it directly 
gives estimates of ln(E(Yi|xi)) and E(Yi|xi) without the need for retransformation. Second, 
it allows for heteroscedasticity through conditional mean-variance relationship. However, 
the GLM estimates, though unbiased, could be quite imprecise if log-scale error is heavy 
tailed or if log-scale error variance is greater than one. Another concern with the GLM 
modeling is that it is difficult to identify the appropriate link and variance structure, a 
priori. Although log link with the gamma error distribution is the most commonly used 
GLM specification in health economics (Blough et al., 1999; Manning and Mullahy, 
2001; Basu et al., 2002), this is not universally appropriate. -A battery of diagnostic tests 
for candidate link and variance functions- the Pregibon Link test (1980), the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test (1995) and the modified Park test (Manning and Mullahy, 2001)- can 
only detect problems but do not provide solution in most cases. Basu and Rathouz (2005) 
                                                 
 
42
 Log link is assumed. 
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proposed an extension of the standard GLM in which link function and variance structure 
are simultaneously estimated with the regression coefficients. 
 
3.3.3 Extended Estimating Equation (EEE) Model   
Basu and Rathouz (2005) proposed a semi-parametric method termed as the Extended 
Estimating Equation (EEE) model to estimate parameters in the link function and 
variance structure simultaneously with the regression coefficients. The EEE model is an 
extension of the standard GLM in two dimensions- first, a mean model is included that 
has an additional parameter governing the link function using the Box-Cox 
transformation (Box and Cox, 1964); and second, parametric models for the variance as a 
function of the mean, are included. The regression coefficients and link parameter are 
estimated via an extension of quasi-likelihood (Wedderburn, 1974) and the variance 
parameters are estimated using additional estimating equations. The parameter estimators 
are shown to be consistent using Monte Carlo simulations.  
The proposed method has three main advantages: First, it helps to identify an appropriate 
link function and suggest an underlying model for the error distribution for a specific 
application; second, the method itself is a robust estimator when no specific distribution 
for the outcome measure can be identified. Lastly, the method decouples the scale of 
estimation for the mean model, determined by the link function, from the scale of interest 
for the scientifically relevant effects: that is regardless of what the link function is used, 





In traditional GLMs, the link function and variance structure are fixed by the investigator.  
In the EEE model, the GLM model for the mean and the variance of Yi is extended to 
include families of link functions g(.; ) and of variance functions h(.; 1, 2). Define a 
parametric family of link functions indexed by  
 
 (3.13) 
where )|();( iiii xYEx    
g(μi; ) is continuous in  and has continuous first derivatives in  for all μi > 0 and for all 
, including  = 0. As  is allowed to vary, the scale of linear predictor ηi, relative to μi 
also varies. However, at ηi = 0, we have μi = 1 and 1 ii   for all . Therefore, the 
family of link functions g(μi;) is standardized such that μi = 1 and  
),,1( kjjiji    when ,0

ix  across all values of . For the link function 
g(μi; ) to be valid for a given , the linear predictor ηi is restricted such that (ηi + 1) > 0 
which implies that ηi > (-1/) if    0, and ηi < (-1/) if   < 0. This ensures that 
.0 ii   
Similar to the link function, define a family h(μi; θ1, θ2) of variance functions indexed by 
(θ1, θ2). Two such families are considered. The first, termed as the power variance (PV) 
family, sets  
2
121 ),;(






















It includes as special cases the variances of several standard distributions used for 
modeling health outcomes. An alternative is the quadratic variance (QV) family given by  
 
2
2121 ),;( iiih     (3.15) 
Note that the dispersion parameter  is subsumed into the variance functions (i.e., in PV, 
 =1 and in QV,  is a multiplier that is present both in 1 and2)  
 
Estimation 
In traditional GLM (Mccullagh and Nelder, 1989), the regression parameters β’s are 
estimated using the following quasi score equations (Wedderburn, 1974): 




















Mccullagh (1983) showed that solving equation (3.16) is equivalent to maximizing a 
quasi-likelihood function that behaves in many ways as a likelihood function for the 
regression parameters. Building on (3.16), define an extended set of estimating functions 
for parameter vector  ),,,( 21    
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Quasi-score equation 
iG  is similar to (3.16) since like β,  is also a mean model 






 for the variance parameters (1, 2) are 
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unbiased and therefore, provide consistent estimators of 1 and 2 under the assumption 
that the mean model μi and the variance model h(μi; 1, 2) are correct (Hall and Sevrini, 
1998). 
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Estimate γ by solving ,0G yielding estimator nˆ . Under mild regulatory conditions,   
 nasn 0ˆ   and )ˆ( 0 n  is asymptotically normal with mean zero and 
covariance matrix An given by  




























Replacing γ by nˆ  and )(
'iiGGE   with )(
iiGG

  in (3.18) yields a sandwich estimator of 
the variance-covariance of nˆ (Huber, 1972; Liang and Zeger, 1986). A Fisher scoring 
algorithm is used to solve .0G  
 
3.4 Description of Data and Variables      
Data is extracted from hospital bills of the elderly (64 years and over) who were admitted 
in a tertiary public hospital in Singapore over the period Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007. The cross-
sectional data contains information on patient’s demographics, length of stay (LOS), 
ward class
43
, primary and secondary diagnoses, outcome of hospitalization, itemized 
                                                 
 
43
 There are five ward classes in public hospitals in Singapore- A, B1, B2 plus, B2 and C- stratified 
according to level of amenities and subsidy from the government. In ward C, up to 80% of the hospital cost 
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inpatient expenses and modes of financing. The total number of hospitalizations recorded 
is 31,246 and sample size used for analysis is 30,192.  
 
The dependent variable is the net inpatient expenditure which is the amount paid for an 
inpatient admission of the elderly on discharge.
44
 It is arrived from the gross inpatient 
expenditure by subtracting the government subsidies and adding the goods and services 
tax. The mean net inpatient expense per hospitalization episode in our sample is about 
S$2,320 and the median expense is about S$1,089. The mean is greater than the median 
indicating the skewed nature of the inpatient expenditure distribution. In fact, top 10% of 
episodes account for 47.9% of total expenditure and top 5% of episodes about 34.9% of 
total expenditure. About 90% of the sample has expenses under S$4,778. The 
expenditure distribution has a long right tail: 7 hospital episodes amount to more than 
S$100,000 each. The maximum inpatient expenditure is around S$207,741.  
 
The choice of covariates is made based on the literature on correlates of health care 
expenditure (Sato and Fushimi, 2008; Polverejan et al., 2009). All the variables that are 
expected to be predictive of costs and are available in the data are chosen as covariates. 
These variables include patient’s age, age-squared, logarithm of length of stay, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
is subsidized while ward A does not receive any subsidy. Subsidy rate varies between 10 to 20% in ward 
B1 and between 50 to 65% in ward B2. In terms of amenities, ward A has the maximum amenities while 
ward C has the least.      
44
 From the policy perspective, it would have been much more useful to examine different components of 
inpatient expenditure separately. For example, medical cost (which is determined more by a patient’s health 
conditions) and accommodation cost (which is determined more by the prices and choices of ward classes 
and ultimately by the patient’s ‘ability to pay’) have completely different policy relevance such as health 
and healthcare inequality. However, we are unable to do so due to the limited nature of the data. Though 
we have the data on the itemized gross inpatient expenditure, we don’t have the data on the itemized 
government subsidies. Hence, we cannot arrive at the itemized net inpatient expenditure that is needed for 
this kind of analysis.      
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dummy(ies) for ward class, gender, primary diagnosis,
45
 number of co-morbidities>10, 
operation, implant, death of the patient,
46
 payout from the government health insurance 
(MediShield),
47
 payout from private health insurance, interaction terms between patient’s 
age and gender and between logarithm of length of stay and ward class. These covariates 
are fixed across different estimation techniques. The median age of a patient is 74.6 
years. Both sexes are well represented in the sample with 52% females and 48% males. 
The median length of stay is 4 days and the mean length of stay is 7.3 days. Nearly 85% 
of admissions are in lower ward classes (50.5% in ward B2 and 34.4% in ward C) and the 
rest in higher ward classes (4.6% in ward A, 7.7% in ward B1 and 2.7% in ward B2+). 
The patient did not survive in 16.9% of episodes. 29.4% of hospitalization episodes had 
payout from insurance with the government insurance accounting for 21.8% and private 
insurance about 7.6%. Surgical operation and implant are used as proxies for severity of 
treatment. In the sample, the operation was done in 33% of cases including 8% cases that 
had an implant. 36% of inpatient cases had number of co-morbidities greater than 10.   
3.5 Overview of Model Selection Procedure  
We first check if the data exhibits lognormality using Box-Cox test (Refer Appendix A, 
A.1. for the procedure to carry out Box-Cox test). Note that if the probability density 
function is not bell-shaped; or is skewed bell-shaped, then the OLS-based model 
                                                 
 
45
 We use DRG ICD 9 classification.  
 
46
 Dummy for death takes value 1 if the patient died in the hospital and 0 if the patient was alive at 
discharge.  
47
 In Singapore, the government offers a low-cost catastrophic health insurance to all Singaporeans on an 
opt-out basis. This insurance is termed as MediShield. The premiums for MediShield can be paid by cash 




estimates are less precise than some of the GLM alternatives though they remain 
consistent for the homoscedastic log-scale errors (Manning and Mullahy, 2001). 
However, the OLS estimates (with homoscedastic retransformation) can be significantly 
biased if the log-scale errors are heteroscedastic. Hence, it is important to test for 
heteroscedasticity in the log-scale residuals. Two tests are employed for the purpose- 
Breusch-Pagan test and Park test- GLM version. The steps involved in applying Park test-
GLM version to test heteroscedasticity are outlined in Appendix A, A.2.   
 
In the face of heteroscedasticity across multiple factors or continuous variables, the GLM 
models can provide a better alternative since the heteroscedastic retransformation for the 
log-OLS model is very difficult. For the GLM modeling, the GLM family test proposed 
by Manning and Mullahy (2001) is carried out to determine the relationship between raw-
scale mean and variance function.  
 
To assess the model fit for linearity, we employ three tests. The first is a variant of 
goodness-of-fit test proposed by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1995), using an F-test that the 
means of the raw scale residuals across all deciles are not significantly different from 
zero (Refer Appendix A, A.3 for details on Hosmer-Lemeshow test). The second is a 
more parsimonious test for nonlinearity known as Pregibon’s Link test (1980, 1981). 
Based on the initial estimate of the regression coefficients, we create a prediction of xiβ 
on the scale of estimation. This variable and its square are included as the only covariates 
in a second version of the model. If the model is linear, then the coefficient on the square 
of the prediction should be insignificantly different from zero. The third test is called 
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Ramsey’s RESET test which, in principle, is quite similar to Pregibon’s Link test. The 
prediction of xiβ on the scale of estimation and its higher powers are included along with 
the other explanatory variables in the second version of the model. If the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the square of prediction and its higher power are simultaneously 
zero is accepted then it indicates that the model is linear.    
 
Overfitting is a major problem with the expenditure data. When the data is highly skewed 
or cases have leverage,
48
 the estimates of β’s would be overly influenced by outliers or 
extreme values and not reflect the true values of β’s. We use Copas test (Copas, 1983), 
involving split-sample cross validation, to detect over-fitting. The procedure to carry out 
Copas test is outlined in Appendix A, A.4.   
 
Lastly, the models are evaluated in terms of their out-of-sample forecast ability. To that 
end, the split-sample cross validation exercise is performed.   
3.6 Estimation Results 
The first step in modeling medical expense data is to examine the distribution of the data 
in detail. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on inpatient expenditure and Figure 3.1 
shows the CDF plot of the expenditure data. The skewed and heavy-tailed nature of the 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics on Inpatient Expenditures of the Elderly 




 percentile 19,126.26 
10
th
 percentile 339.79 Max 207,741.40 
Median 1,086.83 Mean 2,319.79 
75
th
 percentile 2,411.38 Std. Deviation 4,513.20 
90
th
 percentile 4,777.92 Skewness 12.81 
95
th




Figure 3.1: CDF Plot of Inpatient Expenditures of the Elderly Singaporeans 
 
 
The goal here is to estimate conditional mean inpatient expenditure, that is, 
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 )|();( iii xYEx                                                                                        (3.18) 
where Yi is the response (inpatient expenditure in our case), and xi is a set of explanatory 
variables- age, gender, ward class, logarithm of length of stay, primary diagnosis, number 
of co-morbidities >10, severity of treatment, survival status
49
 and insurance status.  
 
We compare the performance of the following models in estimating conditional mean 
inpatient expenditure: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) on ln(Yi), Generalized Linear Models 
(GLM), Extended Estimating Equation (EEE) Model. Summary of tests and estimation 
results are in Appendix B. 
 
3.6.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) on ln(Yi) Model  
The distribution of inpatient expenditure is not perfectly lognormal. See Figure 3.2 that 
plots the histogram of log-transformed inpatient expenditure data and Table 3.2 that 
provides summary statistics on the same. This observation is supported by results of Box-
Cox test and Jarque-Bera normality test (Table 3.3 and 3.4).      
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Logarithm of Inpatient Expenditures  
 
 Mean Median Std Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ln(Yi) 7.0997 6.991 1.0604 0.4236 3.1985 
 
                                                 
 
49
 The survival status of a patient is captured through a dummy that takes value 1 if the patient died in the 
hospital and 0 if the patient was live at discharge.  Note that the survival status only applies for patients’ 
status at the hospital. We lack the information on what happens to patients after leaving the hospital. As a 
result, if a patient died the next day after discharge from the hospital, the person’s survival status would 
still be coded as survived. 
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Table 3.3: Result of Box-Cox Test 
  
Variable ˆ  Std. Error Conclusion50 
Inpatient 
expenditure 
-0.0061** 0.0029 Significantly different from zero 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  
  









Prob > chi sq Conclusion 
1  -265131.77 71006.96 0.000 Reject H0 
0  -229630.58 4.58 0.032 Reject H0 




Table 3.4: Result of Jarque-Bera Normality Test on ln(Yi) 
 
H0 chi sq Prob > chi sq Conclusion 
Normality of log 
of inpatient 
expenditure 
952.4 2.e-207 Reject H0 
 
Even though lognormality is rejected, we still estimate (3.18) by OLS on ln(Yi) for the 
sake of comparison with other models. The estimation results are reported in Table B.2 in 
Appendix B. Prior to doing retransformation to get estimates on the original scale, we 
check if the log-scale residuals are heteroscedastic. Both Breusch-Pagan test and GLM 
version of Park test indicate heteroscedasticity in the log-scale residuals which implies 
that exponentiated log-scale prediction will be a biased estimate of E(Yi|xi). The test 
results are tabulated in Table 3.5 and 3.6. The presence of heteroscedasticity in the log-
scale residuals is also evident in Figure 3.3 where reduced log-scale variance is 
observable at higher values of the predicted mean. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Result of Breusch-Pagan Test of Heteroscedasticity 
 
H0 chi sq(1) Prob > chi sq Conclusion 
Constant 
variance 
14.31 0.0002 Reject H0 
 
Table 3.6: Result of Park Test (GLM Version) of Heteroscedasticity 
 
H0 chi sq(48) Prob > chi sq Conclusion 
Constant 
variance 




Furthermore, there is evidence of non-linearity as indicated by Pregibon’s Link test, 
Ramsey test and Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The test results are reported in Table B.3 in 
Appendix B. Figure 3.4 plots Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow residuals by deciles of 
prediction for inpatient expenditure. It is apparent from the shape of the curve that there 
is something wrong with the model specification. In Copas test to detect overfitting, null 
hypothesis is rejected in 935 runs of total of 1000 runs, indicating substantial overfitting 
(Refer Table B.4 in Appendix B for the test result). 
 
As discussed above, heteroscedasticity in log-scale residuals leads to a retransformation 
bias. The way out is to either perform heteroscedastic retransformation or to employ 
one of the GLM models. We turn to the GLM in the next sub-section. 
 











3.6.2 Generalized Linear Model (GLM)  
The first step in the GLM modeling is to find the kurtosis and variance of log-scale 
residuals in order to make some judgment about precision of the estimates. The log-scale 
residuals are heavy-tailed (kurtosis is 5.442) but their variance (0.161) is less than 1 
which implies that there could be some precision loss in the GLM model. The Modified 
Park test is carried out (assuming log link) to determine the variance structure. The test 
results (reported in Table 3.7) support gamma distribution.  
 
The GLM with log link and gamma family is estimated. The estimation results are 
presented in Table B.5 in Appendix B. The fitted model fails all the specification tests- 
Pregibon’s Link test, Ramsey test, Hosmer-Lemeshow test. (For the tests results, refer 
Table B.6 in Appendix B). 
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Table 3.7: Result of Modified Park Test  
 






2.008*** 0.0338 Coef. = 2 0.06 0.8029 
Accept H0  
Gamma 
Note: Log link is assumed. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  
 
The model misspecification is also evident from the plot of Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow 
residuals against deciles of prediction (see Figure 3.5). This could be either due to wrong 
power or link function on the left side or due to wrong functional form on the right side. 
For our case, Box-Cox test shows that the log link may not be the correct link function.   
Figure 3.5: Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow Residuals by Deciles of Prediction, GLM 
with Log Link  
 
 
Overfitting does not seem to be a problem here since the null hypothesis of Copas test is 
rejected in only 185 out of 1000 runs (See Table B.7 in Appendix B for the test results).   
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We cannot determine the correct link function even though we know that the log link is 
not the correct link function. An alternative approach is to employ the EEE model which 
does not require specifying the link function, rather it estimates the link and variance 
functions along with the regression parameters from the data. We go on to estimate the 
EEE model in the next sub-section.   
3.6.3 Extended Estimating Equation (EEE) Model  
The results from the estimation of the EEE model is provided in Table B.8 in Appendix B 
and the estimates of link and variance functions obtained from the EEE model are 
presented in Table 3.8. The null hypothesis of log link is rejected and that of gamma 
family is accepted. Note that the link is a power link. 
Table 3.8: Estimates of Link and Variance Function  
 
Variable Coef. Std Error Conclusion
51
 
  0.0742*** 0.0069 Not log link 
2  2.0167*** 0.0334 Gamma Distribution 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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H0 chi sq(1) Prob > chi sq 
 






    0.25 0.844 









The plot of Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow residuals against deciles of predicted values of 
inpatient expenditure in Figure 3.6 does not show any non-linearity although the model 
fails the Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The null hypothesis in the Ramsey test is 
rejected. The test results are shown in Table B.9, Appendix B.
52
   
 





The result of Copas test does not show significant overfitting. The null hypothesis is 
rejected in 149 out of 1000 runs (Refer Table B.10 in Appendix B for the test result).   
 
                                                 
 
52
 Pregibon’s Link test is not available for this model.  
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Using the value of the power link from the EEE model, we re-estimate the GLM with the 
power link and gamma family. The regression coefficients (reported in Table B.11, 
Appendix B) obtained from running this model are not comparable to those obtained 
from the EEE model because the EEE model implements the model  ˆ)1(

 ii x  
whereas the GLM with the power link implements the model 
~
 ii x . Clearly, 
~ˆ  . 
The comparison between the EEE and traditional GLM estimators is made on the basis of 
estimates of marginal and incremental effects which are quite similar between the two 
models.   
 
The GLM with power link and gamma family passes Pregibon’s Link test (see Table 
B.12 in Appendix B) and there is no systematic pattern in residuals across deciles of the 
linear prediction in Figure 3.7. Furthermore, there does not seem a problem of overfitting. 
The null hypothesis in Copas test is rejected in 157 out of 1000 runs. The test result is 










Figure 3.7: Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow Residuals by Deciles of Prediction, GLM 





3.7 Split-Sample Cross-Validation 
We also evaluate the models in terms of their predictive performance using 50/50 split- 
sample cross-validation technique. The entire sample is split into two random sub-
samples of same size. The model is fitted to one sub-sample and predictive accuracy is 
evaluated on the other sub-sample.  
 
Table 3.9 reports the statistics used to assess out-of-sample forecast performance of 
various models which include Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). The statistics for OLS on Yi is also 
included for the sake of comparison. On RMSE and MAE criteria, predictive 
performance of the GLM with power link and gamma family is better than the other 
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models, however, OLS on ln(Yi) turns out to be superior in terms of MAPE criterion. The 
performance of the EEE model is quite close to the GLM with power link and gamma 
family.  
 
Table 3.9: Model Performance based on Out-of-Sample Forecasts 
 








OLS on y 
RMSE 2449.62 2393.17 2294.81 2291.62 3409.37 
MAE 806.58 811.56 792.25 791.36 1478.59 
MAPE 0.353 0.358 0.356 0.356 1.564 
 
3.8 Comparison of Different Models 
Based on out-of-sample prediction and goodness-of-fit tests, the performance of various 
models is reviewed below. OLS on Yi has the worst out-of-sample prediction 
performance. The GLM with log link and gamma family performs poorly than the EEE 
model/GLM with power link and gamma family on all out-of-sample forecast criteria. 
Moreover, the GLM with log link and gamma family fails all goodness-of-fit tests which 
could be due to wrongly specified link. (Table 3.10 and 3.11 provide a summary of 
results of goodness-of-fit tests and test of overfitting)  
 
The difference between predictive ability of the EEE model/GLM with power link and 
gamma family and OLS on ln(Yi) is not very clear. The EEE is better than OLS on ln(Yi) 
in terms of RMSE and MAE criteria, however, OLS on ln(Yi) is better as indicated by 
MAPE statistics. It is important to emphasize at this point that OLS ln(Yi) may result in 
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biased estimates of E(Yi|xi) since ln(Yi) is subject to heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, OLS 
on ln(Yi) performs poorly on all goodness-of-fit tests and test of overfitting.  
 
Both the EEE model and the GLM with power link and gamma family seem to fit the 
data better than the other models as no systematic pattern in the residuals across the 
deciles of the linear prediction is observed; and also they do not show substantial 
overfitting. Hence, we use the EEE model to estimate E(Yi|xi) and analyze the impact of 












OLS on ln(Yi) Failed Failed Failed 
GLM, log link and 
gamma family 
Failed Failed Failed 
EEE model N/A Failed Passed 
GLM, power link and 
gamma family 
Passed Failed Passed 
 
 
Table 3.11: Comparison of Models: Test of Overfitting 
 
Model Mean 1ˆ  Std.  Error 
1ˆ: 10 H  
 
OLS on ln(Yi) 0.8317 0.0526 Rejected in 935/1000 runs 
GLM, log link and 
gamma family 
0.9991 0.0061 Rejected in 185/1000 runs 
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 The GLM with power link and gamma family gives estimates of marginal and incremental effects quite 
close to those obtained from the EEE model. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we do not report them here.    
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EEE model 1.0001 0.006 8 Rejected in 149/1000 runs 
GLM, power link and 
gamma family 
0.9996 0.0061 Rejected in 157/1000 runs 
 
 
3.9  Marginal and Incremental Effects 
The foregoing analysis shows that the EEE model could be used safely to estimate mean 
inpatient expenditure as a function of a set of covariates and to make inference about 
different functionals of the mean used to measure the effects of the covariates. In this 
section, we estimate two commonly used functionals of the mean, marginal and 
incremental effects, to analyze the impact of covariates on the mean inpatient 
expenditure.  
 
The marginal effect is the partial derivative of the mean function with respect to any 
continuous covariate, averaged over the empirical distribution of covariates in the model 
(Basu and Rathouz, 2005). The incremental effect is the analogous parameter for discrete 
covariates. The details on estimation of marginal and incremental effects are given in 
Appendix A. A.5.     
 
The estimated marginal and incremental effects of various inpatient characteristics on 
mean inpatient expenditure are presented in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13, respectively 
(Coefficient estimates are given in Table B.8 in Appendix B). The results show that the 
average inpatient expenditure decreases by S$13 for every one year increase in age of a 
patient, controlling for other covariates. This finding could be due to the fact that doctors 
are usually less aggressive in treating the older elderly (Shang and Goldman, 2008; 
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Levinsky et al., 2001). Surprisingly, other things being equal, there is no significant 
difference in hospitalization expenditures of males and females.   
 
A sizeable difference in inpatient expenditures across different ward classes is evident 
from the findings. Compared to ward C, the average bill in ward A is about S$8,241 
higher and the bill in ward B1 is S$5,686 higher. The difference between ward B2 and 
ward C bills narrows down to S$657. 
 
The result on length of stay indicates that a 1% increase in length of stay raises average 
hospital expenditure by S$1,709. As expected, hospitalization episodes involving surgical 
operation and implant cost patients more than the episodes without them. In case of a 
surgical operation, the average bill is approximately S$1,043 more and with an implant, 
costs S$2,411 more.  
 
In accord with the literature (Lubitz and Riley, 1993), we also find that bills of the 
deceased are higher than those of the survivors. The result shows that the mean hospital 
bill is S$876 more in the event of death of a patient.  
 
The result on the impact of insurance on inpatient expenditure is worth highlighting. The 
mean inpatient expenditure per illness episode is higher if there is payout from insurance. 
For patients who had payouts from the government insurance, other things being equal, 
the mean expense per admission is roughly S$288 higher than for patients without 
payout. In case of private health insurance, the difference is S$395. This difference 
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between health care expenditures of those with insurance and those without it
54
 could be 
due to the well-known problems of insurance market- moral hazard and self-selection 
bias. Interestingly, both the average number of co-morbidities and in-hospital mortality 
are significantly
55
 higher for the elderly with the government insurance compared to 
those without it (10 versus 8.9 and 5.84% versus 4.63%) which is an indication of 
relatively poor health of the former group. This could possibly be due to the self-selection 
bias in the government insurance.
56
 In the case of private insurance, patients with private 
insurance seem healthier than those without insurance. The mean number of co-
morbidities for privately insured patients is significantly
57
 lower than for patients without 
private insurance (8.7 versus 9.1). There is also no significant difference in in-hospital 
mortality for patients with private insurance and those without it (4.98% and 4.89%). 




                                                 
 
54
 The elderly with the government (private) insurance refers to the elderly who had payout from the 
government (private) insurance and the elderly without the government (private) insurance refers to the 
elderly without any payout from the government (private) insurance. Note that the elderly without 
government (private) insurance not just includes the uninsured elderly but also the elderly who have bought 
the government (private) insurance but their hospital bill is below the deductible amount, as a result, they 
don’t receive any payment from the insurance. 
     
55
 1% level of significance is chosen.  
 
57
 1% level of significance is chosen. 
 
56, 58
 Note that we do not have conclusive evidence to establish the existence these phenomena in the 
insurance market which would necessitate testing for the endogeneity of the insurance status (Cameron et 
al., 1988; Savage and Wright, 2003). Health insurance status is potentially endogenous, relating to common 
unobservable attributes such as risk attitude and ability to pay which also affect inpatient expenditure. The 
lack of data prevents us from addressing the problem of the endogeneity of the insurance status variables 
which would require estimating separate selection equations for the insurances and subsequently assessing 





The findings show that coronary diseases (S$938), malignant neoplasm (S$664), 
musculoskeletal diseases (S$538), cerebro-vascular diseases (S$501) and central nervous 
system disorders (S$487) are the five most expensive diseases to treat, compared to skin 
diseases which is the reference category. 
 
Table 3.12: EEE Model: Marginal Effects (S$, Year 2007) 
 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Error
+
 
Age    -12.61 -835.68    -0.57     3.24 
Ln(LOS+1) 1,709.41 118.18   118,028.60 158.27 
Note: 
+
Robust standard error of marginal effects are based on sandwich estimator. 
 
Table 3.13: EEE Model: Incremental Effects (S$, Year 2007)  
 




Operation 1,042.78 104.48 53,812.76 62.61 
Implant 2,411.27 234.40 85,532.20 143.51 
Co-morbidities >10 190.59 15.09 11,069.43 26.64 
Class A 8,241.07 389.81 287,953.30 695.24 
Class B1 5,685.81 416.89 62,744.70 588.04 
Class B2 plus 1,888.99 188.98 83,657.52 285.35 
Class B2 656.87 29.55 67,428.55 100.93 
Female -20.32 -1,224.59 -1.55 22.72 
Death 876.49 70.88 51,634.71 105.24 
Govt. health insurance 287.85 22.94 17,634.68 39.77 
Pvt. health insurance 395.22 31.17 23,720.25 62.49 
Infectious and parasitic diseases 130.74 10.00 7,819.55 78.95 
Malignant neoplasm 664.22 53.79 39,894.97 98.35 
Benign neoplasm 313.10 24.17 18,554.69 112.82 
Thyroid gland disorders 139.97 10.70 8,352.50 164.91 
Endocrine gland disorders 46.82 3.56 2,807.28 88.96 
Nutritional disorders 151.88 11.61 9,057.63 275.97 
Metabolic and immunity disorders 156.88 12.01 9,365.23 76.91 
Blood and blood forming organs 176.16 13.50 10,502.72 108.94 
Mental disorders 83.76 6.38 5,012.15 157.80 
Disorders of central nervous system 487.24 37.98 28,675.86 150.39 
Disorders of peripheral nervous system 247.50 19.02 14,695.43 158.32 
Disorders of eye and adnexa -623.86 -38,780.00 -45.46 137.09 
Diseases of ear and mastoid process -60.92 -3671.79 -4.60 120.28 
Hypertensive diseases -160.26 -9707.52 -12.04 119.57 
Ischemic heart diseases 937.91 76.51 55,417.52 108.93 
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Other forms of heart diseases -50.48 -3,039.51 -3.81 60.66 
Cerebrovascular diseases 500.78 39.24 29,584.45 80.44 
Other circulatory system diseases 405.62 31.67 21,493.63 110.84 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease -91.84 -5,541.24 -7.26 61.73 
Other respiratory system diseases 244.47 18.88 14,591.54 65.96 
Diseases of oral cavity, salivary gland and jaws 174.90 13.39 10,419.80 210.93 
Gastrointestinal diseases -33.07 -1,989.28 -2.50 60.63 
Liver, gall and pancreatic diseases 241.30 18.59 14,369.18 77.19 
Urinary disorders 346.93 26.96 20,621.61 78.25 
Genital disorders 273.37 21.07 16,233.03 86.86 
Congenital anomalies 396.00 30.66 23,350.17 658.84 
Ill-defined conditions 21.41 1.63 1,285.31 60.20 
Injury and poisoning 172.42 13.28 10,335.59 76.29 
Musculoskeletal diseases 537.90 42.96 32,245.44 93.57 
Other diseases 335.87 25.98 19,895.32 119.24 
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD9 “V codes”. + Robust standard error of incremental effects are based on sandwich estimator. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
In this paper, we model mean inpatient expenses of the elderly Singaporeans and examine 
the impact of inpatient characteristics such as age, gender, length of stay, ward class, 
primary diagnoses, number of co-morbidities, severity of treatment, survival status and 
insurance status on the mean expenditure. The heavy-tailed and highly-skewed nature of 
the data renders standard modeling technique inappropriate. A number of approaches to 
modeling this kind of data can be found in the literature. On comparing three alternative 
models- OLS on ln(Yi), GLM model with log link and EEE model, we conclude that the 
EEE has the best fit and therefore, use it to estimate expected outcome E(Yi|xi) and the 
impact of covariates xi on E(Yi|xi). The estimated marginal and incremental effects are 
used to study the impact of covariates xi on E(Yi|xi). The results show that the average 
inpatient expenditure declines by S$13 for every one year increase in age of a patient, 
controlling for other covariates. Furthermore, the average hospital bill is higher for the 
insured compared to the uninsured and for the deceased compared to the survivors. As 
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expected, there is a systematic difference in average expenditure across the different ward 
classes with ward A being the most expensive and ward C being the least expensive. The 
model can be used for out-of-sample predictions through intercept adjustments as the 
expenditure profiles shift over time provided that the slope parameters remain the same.     
 
In our estimating equation, some of the explanatory variables could be potentially 
endogenous. For instance, the length of stay is likely to be endogeneous to inpatient 
expenditure (Cantoni and Ronchetti, 2006) since the same unobserved factors that drive 
cost (like unobserved frailty or susceptibility to complications) drive the length of stay. In 
addition to the length of stay, ward classes are also potentially endogenous, driven by 
common unobservable factors (like ability to pay, social status) that also affect inpatient 
expenditure. Health insurance status is also likely to be endogenous to inpatient 
expenditure affected by common unobservable attributes such as risk attitude and ability 
to pay (Cameron et al., 1988; Savage and Wright, 2003). Ideally, inpatient expenditure, 
the ward choice, the length of stay and insurance status should be jointly modeled. This 
exercise is left for the future work.  
  
This study has confined its analysis to study the the effects of covariates on the mean 
inpatient expenditure which could be very different from those on the median expenditure 
or lower/higher end of the expenditure distribution, given the heavy tail nature of the 
distribution. The quantile regression technique can be employed to study such effects 
which we consider for future research. 
 





Chapter 4: Modeling Risk of Catastrophic Inpatient 
Expenditure of the Elderly in Singapore 
4.1 Introduction 
The possibility of a health shock leading to catastrophic financial payment and 
subsequent impoverishment is a matter of great concern. A minority of households face 
very high health care costs in a particular year. These rare occurrences of extremely high 
health care expenditures are reflected in the long right tail of skewed health expenditure 
distributions. For example, in the U.S., the most expensive 5% of the population 
accounted for 49% of all health spending and top 1% spenders accounted for 22% of total 
expenses in 2002. In contrast, health expenses of the bottom 50% spenders made up 
around 3% of overall health spending. Thus, the average health expense per person for 
the top 5% spenders was about 17 times as much as of those in the bottom 50% (Conwell 
and Cohen, 2005).  
   
Certain household characteristics such as households headed by an elderly or disabled 
person, low-income households and those with a member with chronic disease are more 
at risk of catastrophic expenditure. Design of policy interventions to protect households, 
especially more vulnerable ones from suffering financial catastrophe in obtaining 
appropriate medical care is a primary concern of health policy makers. A strand of 
literature estimates the magnitude or extent of catastrophic payments made by households 
on the basis of the households’ income and expenditure surveys (Prescott, 1999; Xu et 
al., 2003; Damme et al., 2003). Catastrophic expenditure is defined as any health 
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expenditure that threatens a household’s financial capacity to maintain its subsistence and 
is not necessarily synonymous with high health care costs (Su et al., 2006). Even  
relatively small expenditure on health care can be disastrous for poor households. We 
depart from these studies and will attempt to predict the probability of incurring very high 
health care expenses using data from hospital bills of the elderly in Singapore and 
determine factors that increase the likelihood of facing such expenditures.  
 
In order to make a statement about likelihood of catastrophic expenditure, one must fit 
the right tail of distribution accurately. Earlier studies have used two statistical models to 
fit health care expenditures- lognormal and Pareto distribution. When these two 
distributions have the same variance, the Pareto distribution has a fatter right tail than the 
lognormal, indicating a higher probability of catastrophic health expenditure. In 
examining the persistence of out-of-pocket medical expenses of the elderly Americans 
overtime, Feenberg and Skinner (1994) assume the lognormal distribution of expenses. 
Rust and Phelan (1997) find that the upper tail of health care expenditure distribution can 
be represented very well by the Pareto distribution. French and Jones (2004) test the two 
m odels using the likelihood ratio test developed by Vuong (1989). They conclude that 
both the lognormal and Pareto distributions fit the top decile of health cost distribution 
equally well. For the entire distribution, the Pareto distribution is inferior to the 
lognormal. However, the lognormal understates the right tail of the distribution, and thus, 
understates the risk of a catastrophic health shock. To correct this, they construct the 
‘fitted’ lognormal distribution, which matches exactly the mean and the 99.5th percentile 
of the empirical distribution. They show that the ‘fitted’ lognormal distribution describes 
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the right tail of the health cost distribution much better than the standard lognormal 
model. 
 
All aforementioned studies estimate univariate models. Beirlant and Goegebeur (2003) 
show that univariate models can be extended to regression models by allowing one or the 
other parameter to vary with x (to be defined later). Building on the work of Rust and 
Phelan (1997), Benitez Silva et al. (2005) fit the conditional Pareto distribution to total 
out-of-pocket health costs by estimating the shape parameter of the distribution as a 
function of demographic, health, insurance coverage, and health care utilization variables. 
 
In the present essay, we adopt the regression framework to forecast the probability of 
incurring excessive hospitalization expenditures by the elderly in Singapore. At the 
outset, we fit both the univariate Pareto and lognormal distributions and examine 
diagnostic plots to assess which distribution fits the data better. Then we go on to fit the 
conditional distributions by estimating the shape parameter as a function of covariates- 
inpatient characteristics such as age, gender, ward class,
59
 primary diagnosis, number of 
co-morbidities, severity of treatment, survival status, health insurance status, and 
compute the probability of high hospital costs.   
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 There are five ward classes in public hospitals in Singapore- A, B1, B2 plus, B2 and C- stratified 
according to level of amenities and subsidy from the government. In ward C, up to 80% of the hospital cost 
is subsidized while ward A does not receive any subsidy. Subsidy rate varies between 10 to 20% in ward 
B1 and between 50 to 65% in ward B2. In terms of amenities, ward A has the maximum amenities while 




Our empirical results suggest that, controlling for other explanatory variables, the 
probability of facing hospitalization costs greater than S$10,000 lies in the range of 1.02 
to 5.64% and that of costs greater than S$50,000 is less than 1.23%. The elderly with 
insurance are more at the risk of catastrophic expenditure than the elderly without 
insurance. The probability of incurring hospitalization expenditure more than S$10,000 
by the elderly with the government insurance
60
 varies from 1.7 to 8.8% while the 
corresponding probability range for the elderly without the government insurance is 0.9 
to 4.9%. This difference is more pronounced for private insurance (2.9-10.8% versus 0.9-
5.3%). Among different diseases afflicting the elderly, the probability of catastrophic 
expenditure is highest for musculoskeletal diseases. Another pattern that has emerged is 
that the oldest old (85 years and above) face the lowest probability of experiencing 
catastrophic hospitalization expenses. Furthermore, the patients admitted in higher ward 
classes (A and B1) run higher risk of incurring huge expenses than patients in subsidized 
wards (B2 and C), other things being equal. This is expected given the structure of 
different wards.     
 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, both distributions- Pareto 
and lognormal are explained. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 is devoted to 
computation of the probabilities of catastrophic expenditure. It consists of four sub-
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 The elderly with the government (private) insurance refers to the elderly who had payout from the 
government (private) insurance and the elderly without the government (private) insurance refers to the 
elderly without any payout from the government (private) insurance. Note that the elderly without the 
government (private) insurance not just includes the uninsured elderly but also the elderly who have bought 
the government (private) insurance but their hospital bill is below the deductible amount, as a result, they 





sections. Sub-section 4.4.1 compares the univariate Pareto and lognormal distributions in 
modeling the data by examining the various diagnostic plots. The conditional 
distributions are estimated in Sub-section 4.4.2. In Sub-sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, insights 
from the regression results are used to compute probabilities of experiencing catastrophic 
expenditures by inpatient characteristics. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Statistical Methodology   
 4.2.1 Pareto Distribution   





















where α > 0 is a shape parameter and y0 is a scale parameter.  The smaller is the value of 
α, the fatter is the tail of the distribution which implies higher probability of facing 
catastrophic expenditure. 




























Moments and Other Basic Properties 
The Pareto density has a polynomial right tail that regularly varies at infinity with index 
(- α - 1). Thus, the right tail gets heavier as α becomes smaller, implying that only low-
order moments exist. In particular, the k
th
 moment of the Pareto distribution exists only if 































































It follows that 21   and 92  , as     
 
For the extremely heavy-tailed members (with α<1) of this class of distributions, other 
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Harmonic mean:     10
11 1exp 
  yYEYh . 
Mode: 0mod yY e    





4.2.2 Lognormal Distribution 
A random variable Y is said to have a lognormal distribution with parameters μ and σ if 
ln(Y) has a normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ.  
Equivalently, Y = exp(W) 
where W is normally distributed with mean μ and standard deviation σ. While the 
parameter μ can be any real number, the parameter σ must be a positive real number.  
 
The p.d.f. of the lognormal distribution is given by 


















Thus, the distribution arises as the distribution of Y = exp(W), where  .,~ 2NW   
 















where  denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.   
The lognormal distribution is skewed to the right. For a given μ, the skewness increases 




Moments and Other Basic Properties 
The low-order moments and other basic characteristics of the lognormal distribution are 
as follows: 
Mean:    25.0exp  YE   
Variance:          12exp1)exp(2expvar 22  Y  
where ω = exp(σ2) 
Coefficient of variation:      11exp
2  YCV  
Coefficient of skewness:    123    
Coefficient of kurtosis: 332
234
4    
Note that 3>0 and 4>3, that is, the distribution is positively skewed and leptokurtic. 
Geometric mean:    )exp(lnexp  YEYg  
Note that the geometric mean coincides with the median. 
   
Mode:  2mod exp  eY  
 
The lognormal quantiles are given by 
      10,exp 11   uuuF   
where  denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.  
 
4.2.3 Conditional Shape Parameters and Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
A straightforward approach to tail analysis in the presence of covariate information 
consists of modeling one or more of the parameters of a univariate model as a function of 
the covariates (Berlaint et al., 2004). For example, in case of the Pareto distribution, the 
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shape parameter α can be estimated as a function of the covariate vector, xi, using 
maximum likelihood method, as shown below.   
 
Let Y1,…,Ym be independent observations on random variable Y and xi represent the 
covariate vector associated with Yi such that   
  .,...,1,)(,~ 0 mixyParxY iii   
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The maximum likelihood estimator ˆ  can be obtained by maximizing (4.1) with respect 
to β. ˆ  is then used to solve for .ˆ  Similarly, the maximum likelihood approach is 
followed to estimate the shape parameter σ of the lognormal distribution as a function of 




Let Y1,…,Ym be independent observations on a lognormally distributed random variable Y 
and xi represent the covariate vector associated with Yi . The p.d.f. of Yi, given xi, can be 
expressed as follows:    
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     (4.2) 
The maximum likelihood estimators ˆ  and ˆ  can be obtained by maximizing (4.2) with 
respect to μ and β. ˆ  is then used to solve for ˆ . Approximate inference about the 
regression coefficients can be drawn on the basis of the limiting normal distribution of 
the maximum likelihood estimator or using the profile likelihood approach.   
4.3 Description of Data  
Data is extracted from hospital bills of the elderly (64 and over) who were admitted in a 
tertiary public hospital in Singapore over the period Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007. The cross-
sectional data contains information on patient’s demographics, length of stay, ward class, 
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primary and secondary diagnoses, outcome of hospitalization, itemized inpatient 
expenses and modes of financing. The total number of hospitalizations recorded is 31,246 
and sample size used for analysis is 30,192.  
 
The mean inpatient expenditure per episode (S$2,320) is greater than the median 
expenditure (S$1,087) indicating that the average is influenced by a small number of 
catastrophic episodes costing very large sums (Roos, Shapiro, and Tate, 1989; Berk and 
Monheit, 1992 and 2001; Eichner, McClellan, and Wise, 1998; and Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 2000). In fact, the top 10% of episodes account for 47.9% of total 
expenditure and top 5% of episodes about 34.9% of total expenditure. About 90% of the 
sample has expenses under S$4,778. The expenditure distribution has a long right tail: 7 
hospital episodes cost more than S$100,000 each to patients. The maximum inpatient 
expenditure is around S$207,741. These features of inpatient expenditure distribution are 
evident from the histogram and kernel density plots in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, 
respectively. Specifically, note that   
• Mass of the distribution is around S$500, indicating high probability of small 
expenditures (S$500).  












Figure 4.1: Histogram Plot of Inpatient Expenditure   
 
 
Note: Inpatient expenditure data is truncated at S$5000 to depict the mode 
 
 





4.4 Estimation Results 
In Subsection 4.4.1, diagnostic plots from fitting the univariate Pareto and lognormal 
distributions to the data on hospitalization expense are examined to evaluate which 
distribution explains the data better. The conditional distributions are estimated in 
Subsection 4.4.2 by letting the shape parameter to be a function of covariates. 
Probabilities of incurring extreme expenditure during an episode of hospitalization are 
provided in Subsection 4.4.3.    
4.4.1 Fitting Univariate Distribution  
Pareto Distribution 
Following Rust and Phelan (1997), we fit the univariate Pareto distribution to 
hospitalization expenditure data. It is clear from the histogram and kernel density plots of 
inpatient expenditure that the mass of the distribution is around S$500 followed by a long 
right tail. Therefore, in estimating the Pareto distribution, we choose the cut-off (y0) at 
S$478 which corresponds to the mode of the empirical distribution. The estimation 
results of the univariate Pareto distribution are presented in Table 4.1 and summary 
statistics of fitted model in Table 4.2. The maximum likelihood estimate of the shape 
parameter   is 0.7982.   
Lognormal Distribution  
Next, the univariate lognormal distribution is fitted to hospitalization expenditure data. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of mean μ and standard deviation σ of the fitted 
lognormal distribution are 7.1 and 1.06, respectively (See Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimate of Shape Parameter of Univariate Pareto 
Distribution       
 
Parameter Estimate Robust Z-Stat. 
  0.7982*** 220.17 
 Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  
No. of Obs. = 24522, Log-likelihood = -212061.55 
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Table 4.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters of Univariate Lognormal 
Distribution 
 
Parameter Estimate Robust Z-Stat. 
  7.1*** 1163.32 
  1.06***    234.37 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  
No. of Obs. = 30192, Log-likelihood = -258966.4 
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Goodness of Fit 
We examine the Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot to check the appropriateness of the fitted 
Pareto and lognormal distributions. In the Q-Q plot, the quantiles of the fitted cumulative 
distribution are plotted against the quantiles of the empirical cumulative distribution. If 
the fitted distribution describes the empirical distribution well, then all the points in the 
Q-Q plot should fall onto the diagonal line. The Q-Q plot of the fitted Pareto distribution 
is shown in Figure 4.3 and that of the fitted lognormal distribution in Figure 4.4.  
 
 
We see that there is a large divergence from the diagonal line in the Q-Q plot for the 
Pareto distribution while for the lognormal distribution the Q-Q plot falls on the diagonal 
line at bottom and upper end of the distribution.  
 










The cumulative distributions from the fitted Pareto and lognormal along with the 
empirical distribution are shown in Figure 4.5 and the corresponding probability densities 
in Figure 4.6. Also, shown in Figure 4.7, is the kernel density plot of inpatient 
expenditure together with the probability densities from the fitted Pareto and lognormal.  
 
On inspection of Q-Q plots, c.d.f.’s and p.d.f.’s of the fitted Pareto and lognormal 
distributions, we find that the lognormal seems to provide a better fit than the Pareto to 
the expenditure distribution. However, the lognormal does not perfectly fit the 
expenditure distribution.
61
 As shown in Figure 4.5, the lognormal model slightly 
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 We also examined the Q-Q plots of the fitted Pareto and lognormal distributions for the top decile of the 
distribution which represents the right tail of the distribution.  For the top decile, the Q-Q plot falls on the 
diagonal line at bottom end for the Pareto distribution and for the lognormal distribution, the Q-Q plot 
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understates the right tail of the distribution, and thus, slightly understates the possibility 
of catastrophic health costs. This conclusion is reinforced by French and Jones (2004) 
who have shown that for the entire health cost distribution, the standard lognormal model 
though superior to the standard Pareto model, underestimates the right tail. In contrast, 
the Pareto model, as shown in Figure 4.5, greatly overstates the right tail of the 
distribution.  Since none of the fitted distributions provide a perfect fit, we estimate both 
the models in a regression framework to provide a probability range of the catastrophic 
expenditure conditional on various covariates in Subsections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4. The 
predicted probabilities from the conditional lognormal model form the lower bound and 
those from the conditional Pareto model form the upper bound of the range. However, as 
the lognormal model better fits the data, we only present and interpret coefficients from 
the estimation of the conditional lognormal model in the next section. The estimation 
results of the conditional Pareto model are provided in the Appendix C (Table C.1). Note 
that a negative and significant coefficient lowers α, indicating fatter tail of the 








                                                                                                                                                 
 
traces the reference line at upper end of the distribution. Based on this observation, none of the fitted 
distributions appears to outperform the other for the top decile.      
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4.4.2 Conditional Shape Parameters 
Both the lognormal and Pareto distributions are estimated in a regression framework 
wherein the shape parameter (σ and α) is explained in terms of covariates- patient’s age 
and gender, ward class, primary diagnosis, number of co-morbidities, severity of 
treatment, survival status,
62
 health insurance status. The age of the patient is categorized 
into five broad groups- 64-69 years, 70-74 years, 75-79 years, 80-84 years and 85 years 
and over, with 85 years and over forming the base category. The dummy for gender takes 
value 1 for a female patient and 0 for a male patient. The severity of treatment is captured 
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 Note that the survival status only applies for patients’ status at the hospital. We lack the information on 
what happens to patients after leaving the hospital. As a result, if a patient died the very next day after 
discharge from the hospital, the person’s survival status would still be coded as survived.   
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through the dummies for surgical operation and implant and the complication of the case 
through dummy that takes value 1 if number of co-morbidities a patient is suffering from 
is greater than 10 and 0, otherwise. The dummies for primary diagnosis are created based 
on International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 9 
(ICD 9) codes. The dummy for skin diseases is excluded for the sake of comparison. The 
survival status is captured through a dummy that takes value 1 if the patient died in the 
hospital and 0 if the patient was alive at discharge. We also introduce two dummies for 
health insurance- one for the government insurance
63
 and the other one for private 
insurance. The results from estimating the conditional lognormal distribution are 
tabulated below.   
 
Table 4.5: Results from Fitting Conditional Lognormal Distribution    
 
  
Variable Coef. Robust Z-Stat. 









Age group 64-69 0.061*** 4.79 Mental disorders  0.109** 2.07 




   0.019 0.51 




   0.012 0.23 
Age group 80-84   0.037*** 2.74 
Disorders of eye 
and adnexa 
 0.755*** 13.95 
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 In Singapore, the government offers a low-cost catastrophic health insurance to all Singaporeans on an 
opt-out basis. This insurance is termed as MediShield. The premiums for MediShield can be paid by cash 






Gender  -0.029*** -3.67 
Diseases of ear and 
mastoid process 
 0.172***  3.68 
Operation 0.105***  8.08 
Hypertensive 
diseases 
 0.232*** 5.58 
Implant 0.561*** 30.88 
Ischemic heart 
diseases 
 0.090*** 3.04 
Co-morbidities>10 0.087***  9.01 
Other forms of 
heart diseases 
 -0.062** -2.06 
Class A 0.845*** 32.18 
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
 0.077*** 2.63 








 0.238*** 8.43 
Class B2   0.011 1.2 
Other respiratory 
system diseases 
   0.038 1.49 
Dummy for death 0.243*** 10.65 
Diseases of oral 
cavity, salivary 
gland and jaws 










Liver, gall and 
pancreatic diseases 
  -0.024 -0.74 
Infectious and 
parasitic diseases  
0.122***  4.29 Urinary disorders   -0.027 -1.02 
Malignant 
neoplasm 
0.107*** 4.18 Genital disorders  -0.174*** -4.64 






 -0.107 -1.56 
Ill-defined 

















 -0.038 -1.32 Other diseases 0.178*** 4.06 
Blood and blood 
forming organs 
 -0.060* -1.73 Constant 0.662*** 25.61 
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD 9 “V codes”. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  




In interpreting the coefficients, note that a positive and significant coefficient indicates a 
higher value of the shape parameter (σ), implying that the expenditure distribution tends  
to be more skewed to the right and consequently, higher chances of experiencing 
catastrophic expenditures.  
 
Younger elderly compared to older elderly and males compared to females contribute to 
the more skewed expenditure distribution. The finding regarding older elderly could be 
attributed to the fact that older elderly are usually not put to very aggressive treatments as 
their bodies are too frail to stand them (Shang and Goldman, 2008; Levinsky et al., 
2001).  
 
The coefficients on dummies for the ward classes A, B1 and B2+ are positive and 
significant, decreasing in magnitude from ward A to ward B2+. This implies that patients 
in ward A, the most expensive ward, are at the maximum risk of catastrophic expenses, 
followed by ward B1 and ward B2+. The reference category is ward class C.  
 
As expected, the more complicated the case and the more severe the treatment, the 
greater is the likelihood of being in the right tail of the distribution. The likelihood is also 
higher if the patient died in the hospital.    
 
Interestingly, the coefficients on insurance dummies (both the government and private) 
are positive and significant, implying that the probability of facing extreme expenditures 
is higher if the patient is covered by insurance. This difference between in probability of 
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catastrophic health care expenditures of those with insurance and those without it
64
 could 
be due to the well-known problems of insurance market- moral hazard and self-selection 
bias. To explore this further, we compare the mean number of co-morbidities and 
percentage of deaths of patients for hospitalization episodes that had payout from the 
government insurance and those without it. The same comparison is done for private 
insurance, respectively. These two measures are proxies for illness severity of patients.  
 
We find that there is a significant
65
 difference in the mean number of co-morbidities for 
episodes covered by the government insurance and those without it (10 versus 8.9). The 
percentage of deaths is significantly higher in episodes covered by the government 
insurance than episodes without it (5.84% versus 4.63%). Both these observations point 
to the fact that patients who had payout from the government insurance are sicklier than 
patients without it. This could be suggestive of the self-selection bias in the government 
insurance. 
 
In case of the private insurance, patients who had payout from private insurance seem 
healthier than those without it. The mean number of co-morbidities in episodes covered 
by private insurance is significantly lower than in episodes without it (8.7 versus 9.1). 
Also, there is no significant difference in the percentage of deaths in episodes covered by 
                                                 
 
     
65
 1% level of significance is chosen.  
104 
 
private insurance and those without it (4.98% versus 4.89%). Thus, the positive 




With respect to primary diagnosis, infectious and parasitic diseases, malignant neoplasm, 
mental disorders, diseases of eye and adnexa disorders, diseases of ear and mastoid 
process, hypertensive diseases, ischemic heart diseases, cerebrovascular diseases, other 
circulatory system diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, ill-defined 
conditions, injury and poisoning, musculoskeletal diseases and other diseases, on one 
hand, increase the chances of experiencing huge expenses compared to skin diseases. On 
the other hand, diseases of blood and blood forming organs, other forms of heart diseases, 
genital disorders and congenital anomalies lower the chances of incurring very high 
expenditure compared to skin diseases.       
 
In the next two sections, we predict probabilities of facing catastrophic hospitalization 
expenditures, conditional on a set of covariates. The first step involves predicting 
conditional σ and α which are used to calculate probabilities in the second step.   
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 Note that we do not have conclusive evidence to establish the existence of self-selection bias and moral 
hazard in the insurance market which would necessitate testing for the endogeneity of the insurance status. 
Health insurance status is potentially endogenous, relating to common unobservable attributes such as risk 
attitude and ability to pay which also affect inpatient expenditure (Cameron et al., 1988; Savage and 
Wright, 2003). The lack of data prevents us from addressing the problem of the endogeneity of the 
insurance status variables which would require estimating separate selection equations for the insurances 
and subsequently assessing the correlation of the error terms. 
105 
 
4.4.3 Probabilities of Catastrophic Expenditure by Insurance Status and Primary 
Diagnosis  
Table 4.6 reports predicted values of shape parameters (σ and α), conditional on a set of 
covariates, by inpatient characteristics of interest- insurance status and primary diagnosis. 
These are averaged predicted values of shape parameters over all other covariates. The 
predicted values of shape parameters are further used to compute probabilities of 
incurring catastrophic expenditure during an episode of hospitalization, categorized by 
insurance status and primary diagnosis. With respect to primary diagnosis, the top four 
most expensive disease types, musculoskeletal, malignant neoplasm, other circulatory 
system diseases and ischemic heart diseases, are considered.
67
 Injuries, the seventh most 
expensive disease type, are also considered because of the large number of episodes 
diagnosed with injuries. Six threshold levels are chosen in an increasing order to define 
catastrophic expenditure- S$10,000, S$30,000, S$50,000, S$70,000, S$90,000 and 
S$100,000.  
 
The probabilities from the conditional Pareto model are substantially higher than those 
calculated from the conditional lognormal model. Hence, the probabilities from the 
conditional lognormal model form a lower bound and those from the conditional Pareto 
model serve as an upper bound on the likelihood of financial catastrophe resulting from 
hospitalization. 
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 Diseases of central nervous system and cerebrovascular diseases are the fifth and the sixth most 
expensive disease types but we exclude them from analysis because of small sample diagnosed with them.     
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With private insurance, an elderly person’s probability of incurring inpatient expenditure 
greater than S$10,000 in an illness episode ranges from 2.9 to 10.8% while a person 
without private insurance has only 0.9 to 5.3% chance of exceeding that limit, other 
things being equal. In other words, the elderly with private insurance is more than twice 
likely to face expenditure greater than S$10,000 compared to those without it. The gap in 
the probability of catastrophic expenditure with and without the government insurance is 
narrower compared to the case of private insurance. The corresponding probability range 
with the government insurance is 1.7-8.8% and without it is 0.9-4.9%.  
 
 The probability of incurring catastrophic expenditure (>S$10,000) varies from 5.6 to 
14% for the elderly suffering from musculoskeletal diseases; from 1.3 to 8.3% for those 
suffering from malignant neoplasm and from 1.1 to 5.8% for those with other circulatory 
system diseases. The corresponding probability range for the elderly diagnosed with 
coronary diseases is 2-8.8% and for those hospitalized with injuries is 2-8.1%. For 
patients without any of these disease conditions, other things being equal, the risk of 
facing hospitalization costs greater than S$10,000 lies broadly in the range 0.85-5.6%. 
The differential in the probability of catastrophic expenditure between those with and 




Table 4.6: Conditional σ and α and Probability (%) of Incurring Catastrophic Expenditures  
 
 ˆ  ˆ  >S$10,000 >S$30,000 >S$50,000 >S$70,000 >S$90,000 >S$100,000 
Overall  1.0180 0.9454 1.02-5.64 0.03-2.00 0.00-1.23 0.00-0.90 0.00-0.71 0.00-0.64 
With Govt insurance 1.1130 0.7997 1.70-8.79 0.09-3.65 0.02-2.43 0.01-1.85 0.00-1.52 0.00-1.39 
W/o Govt. insurance 0.9915 0.9940 0.86-4.87 0.02-1.63 0.00-0.98 0.00-0.70 0.00-0.55 0.00-0.49 
With Pvt. Insurance 1.2410 0.7309 2.86-10.83 0.27-4.85 0.07-3.34 0.03-2.61 0.01-2.17 0.01-2.01 
W/o Pvt. Insurance 0.9997 0.9660 0.91-5.30 0.03-1.83 0.00-1.12 0.00-0.81 0.00-0.63 0.00-0.57 
With musculo-skeletal diseases 1.4814 0.6468 5.55-13.99 0.98-6.88 0.37-4.94 0.18-3.97 0.10-3.38 0.08-3.16 
W/o musculo-skeletal diseases 0.9898 0.9660 0.85-5.30 0.02-1.83 0.00-1.12 0.00-0.81 0.00-0.63 0.00-0.57 
With malignant neoplasm 1.0560 0.8178 1.27-8.32 0.05-3.39 0.01-2.23 0.00-1.69 0.00-1.38 0.00-1.27 
W/o malignant neoplasm 1.0135 0.9627 0.99-5.35 0.03-1.86 0.00-1.14 0.00-0.82 0.00-0.65 0 .00-0.58 
With other circulatory diseases 1.0296 0.9365 1.09-5.80 0.04-2.07 0.01-1.28 0.00-0.94 0.00-0.74 0.00-0.67 
W/o other circulatory  diseases 1.0175 0.9459 1.02-5.64 0.03-1.99 0.00-1.23 0.00-0.89 0.00-0.71 0.00-0.64 
With ischemic heart diseases 1.1500 0.8009 2.00-8.76 0.13-3.63 0.03-2.41 0.01-1.84 0.00-1.51 0.00-1.39 
W/o ischemic heart diseases 1.0073 0.9584 0.95-5.42 0.03-1.89 0.00-1.16 0.00-0.84 0.00-0.66 0.00-0.60 
With injury 1.1497 0.8284 2.00-8.06 0.13-3.24 0.03-2.12 0.01-1.61 0.00-1.31 0.00-1.20 




Presented below is a more detailed analysis of likelihood of running into huge hospital 
bills of patients suffering from some of the most expensive diseases with respect to the 
age category and ward class of admission.  
4.4.4 Probability of Catastrophic Expenditure for Some Most Expensive Diseases- 
Disaggregated Analysis   
In Tables 4.7-4.11, probabilities of catastrophic expenditure during an inpatient episode 
for patients diagnosed with musculoskeletal, malignant neoplasm, other circulatory 
system diseases, ischemic heart diseases and injuries disaggregated by age group and 
ward class of admission are presented. As noted above, the predicted probabilities from 
the conditional lognormal model form the lower bound of the probability range and those 
from the conditional pareto model form the upper bound of the range.  
 
The results show that patients suffering from musculoskeletal disease are at the highest 
risk of incurring expenditure greater than S$10,000 in a hospitalization episode, 
estimated to be between 13.8-27.9% in ward A and 2.2-7.2% in ward C. Even in lower 
ward classes, there is a slight probability of facing hospital costs greater than S$30,000 
(0.3-4.2% in ward B2, 0.5-2.8% in ward C) and S$50,000 (0.1-2.9% in ward B2, 0.1-
1.8% in ward C), especially for younger elderly. The oldest old face the smallest 
likelihood of catastrophic expenditure.  
   
Among the elderly diagnosed with malignant neoplasm, the probability of incurring 
expenditure more than S$10,000 in the highest ward class (ward A) lies in the range of 
9.2-18.1% while in the lowest ward class (ward C), the probability range is 0.6-5.7%. For 
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a higher threshold expenditure (>S$30,000), the probability varies from 2.6 to 9.8% in 
ward A, nearly zero to 2.9% in ward B2 and zero to 2% in ward C.  
 
Similar trends are present for other circulatory system diseases. The probability of 
exceeding inpatient expenditure S$10,000, ceteris paribus, lies between 10-18.1% in 
ward A and between 0.6-4.2% in ward C.  
 
For ischemic heart disease patients, the oldest old are exposed to the least risk of 
incurring huge costs. A conservative estimate of the probability of facing hospitalization 
expenditure more than S$10,000 is 11% in ward A which drops to approximately 1% in 
wards B2 and C. However, on a higher side, the probability estimates of spending more 
than S$10,000 on inpatient care are 23.6% in ward A, 7.6% in ward B2 and 6.4% in ward 
C.  
    
The sharp variation in chances of incurring huge expenses across wards is also present for 
episodes diagnosed with injuries. For a threshold of S$10,000, the probability ranges 
from 10.8 to 17.8% in ward A; from 1.4 to 8% in ward B2 and from 1.4% to 6% in ward 
C. For a higher threshold expenditure (S$50,000), the probability range is 1.9-7.2% in 
ward A, 0-2.1% in ward B2 and 0-1.4% in ward C.          
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Table 4.7: Probability (%) of Incurring Catastrophic Expenditures for Musculoskeletal Diseases 
 
 Age group >S$10,000 >S$30,000 >S$50,000 >S$70,000 >S$90,000 >S$100,000 
Ward A 
64-69 yrs 14.30-32.45 5.90-21.61 3.64-17.89 2.58-15.79 1.97-14.39 1.75-13.84 
70-74 yrs 14.99-37.25 6.44-26.07 4.06-22.09 2.93-19.80 2.27-18.25 2.03-17.64 
75-79 yrs 13.15-24.11 5.05-14.42 2.99-11.36 2.06-9.70 1.54-8.63 1.35-8.21 
80-84 yrs 13.24-31.81 5.12-21.03 3.04-17.35 2.10-15.28 1.57-13.90 1.38-13.36 
>84 yrs 9.12-13.99 2.54-6.88 1.25-4.94 0.75-3.97 0.50-3.38 0.42-3.16 
Ward B1 
64-69 yrs 12.86-35.38 4.84-24.30 2.84-20.41 1.94-18.19 1.44-16.70 1.26-16.11 
70-74 yrs 13.25-39.78 5.12-28.51 3.04-24.42 2.10-22.05 1.57-20.44 1.38-19.79 
75-79 yrs 11.87-30.60 4.17-19.95 2.35-16.35 1.56-14.34 1.13-13.01 0.98-12.48 
80-84 yrs 9.34-22.26 2.65-12.94 1.32-10.05 0.80-8.51 0.54-7.52 0.46-7.14 
>84 yrs 6.30-17.91 1.25-9.62 0.50-7.21 0.26-5.96 0.16-5.17 0.13-4.87 
Ward B2 
64-69 yrs 4.31-13.13 0.60-6.31 0.20-4.48 0.09-3.58 0.05-3.03 0.03-2.82 
70-74 yrs 3.98-12.06 0.51-5.61 0.16-3.93 0.07-3.11 0.04-2.61 0.03-2.43 
75-79 yrs 2.68-8.99 0.23-3.77 0.06-2.51 0.02-1.92 0.01-1.58 0.01-1.45 
80-84 yrs 2.05-7.87 0.14-3.14 0.03-2.05 0.01-1.55 0.00-1.26 0.00-1.15 
>84 yrs 0.50-6.07 0.01-2.21 0.00-1.38 0.00-1.01 0.00-0.80 0.00-0.73 
Ward C 
64-69 yrs 3.65-9.31 0.43-3.95 0.13-2.65 0.05-2.04 0.03-1.67 0.02-1.54 
70-74 yrs 3.18-8.35 0.33-3.40 0.09-2.24 0.04-1.70 0.02-1.39 0.01-1.27 
75-79 yrs 1.60-6.08 0.08-2.21 0.02-1.38 0.00-1.01 0.00-0.80 0.00-0.73 
80-84 yrs 1.65-8.06 0.09-3.25 0.02-2.13 0.00-1.61 0.00-1.31 0.00-1.20 




Table 4.8: Probability (%) of Incurring Catastrophic Expenditures for Malignant Neoplasm 
 
 Age group >S$10,000 >S$30,000 >S$50,000 >S$70,000 >S$90,000 >S$100,000 
Ward A 
64-69 yrs 9.53-19.89 2.76-11.10 1.39-8.46 0.85-7.08 0.58-6.19 0.49-5.85 
70-74 yrs 9.35-19.05 2.66-10.46 1.32-7.92 0.80-6.59 0.54-5.75 0.46-5.43 
75-79 yrs 8.91-15.40 2.43-7.83 1.18-5.72 0.70-4.65 0.47-3.99 0.39-3.74 
80-84 yrs 8.51-16.89 2.22-8.89 1.05-6.59 0.62-5.41 0.40-4.67 0.34-4.40 
>84 yrs 8.77-19.23 2.35-10.60 1.13-8.04 0.67-6.70 0.44-5.84 0.37-5.52 
Ward B1 
64-69 yrs 7.19-21.44 1.61-12.29 0.70-9.49 0.38-8.01 0.24-7.05 0.19-6.68 
70-74 yrs 7.09-21.46 1.57-12.31 0.68-9.51 0.37-8.02 0.23-7.06 0.19-6.69 
75-79 yrs 6.99-18.46 1.52-10.03 0.65-7.55 0.35-6.26 0.22-5.45 0.18-5.14 
80-84 yrs 6.44-20.47 1.30-11.54 0.53-8.84 0.28-7.42 0.17-6.50 0.13-6.16 
>84 yrs 6.31-18.30 1.25-9.91 0.50-7.45 0.26-6.17 0.16-5.36 0.13-5.06 
Ward B2 
64-69 yrs 0.75-7.24 0.02-2.80 0.00-1.80 0.00-1.35 0.00-1.09 0.00-0.99 
70-74 yrs 0.74-7.44 0.02-2.91 0.00-1.88 0.00-1.41 0.00-1.14 0.00-1.04 
75-79 yrs 0.62-7.04 0.01-2.70 0.00-1.73 0.00-1.29 0.00-1.03 0.00-0.94 
80-84 yrs 0.62-8.14 0.01-3.29 0.00-2.16 0.00-1.63 0.00-1.33 0.00-1.22 
>84 yrs 0.31-6.85 0.00-2.60 0.00-1.66 0.00-1.23 0.00-0.99 0.00-0.90 
Ward C 
64-69 yrs 0.64-5.57 0.01-1.96 0.00-1.21 0.00-0.88 0.00-0.69 0.00-0.63 
70-74 yrs 0.75-5.81 0.02-2.08 0.00-1.29 0.00-0.94 0.00-0.74 0.00-0.67 
75-79 yrs 0.53-5.67 0.01-2.01 0.00-1.24 0.00-0.90 0.00-0.71 0.00-0.65 
80-84 yrs 0.51-5.89 0.01-2.12 0.00-1.31 0.00-0.96 0.00-0.76 0.00-0.69 




Table 4.9: Probability (%) of Incurring Catastrophic Expenditures for Other Circulatory System Diseases 
 
 Age group >S$10,000 >S$30,000 >S$50,000 >S$70,000 >S$90,000 >S$100,000 
Ward A 
64-69 yrs 9.13-13.23 2.54-6.37 1.25-4.53 0.75-3.63 0.50-3.07 0.42-2.86 
70-74 yrs 9.25-14.39 2.61-7.14 1.29-5.15 0.78-4.16 0.53-3.54 0.44-3.31 
75-79 yrs 10.56-15.89 3.35-8.17 1.77-6.00 1.13-4.90 0.79-4.21 0.68-3.95 
80-84 yrs 12.60-28.86 4.66-18.42 2.70-14.95 1.83-13.03 1.35-11.76 1.18-11.26 
>84 yrs 9.43-18.27 2.70-9.88 1.35-7.43 0.82-6.15 0.56-5.35 0.47-5.04 
Ward B1 
64-69 yrs 6.95-15.86 1.51-8.15 0.64-5.98 0.35-4.88 0.21-4.19 0.17-3.93 
70-74 yrs 8.80-21.64 2.37-12.45 1.14-9.63 0.68-8.13 0.45-7.16 0.38-6.79 
75-79 yrs 6.48-12.74 1.32-6.05 0.54-4.28 0.28-3.41 0.17-2.87 0.14-2.68 
80-84 yrs 5.67-10.90 1.02-4.90 0.39-3.37 0.19-2.64 0.11-2.20 0.09-2.04 
>84 yrs 6.69-15.53 1.40-7.92 0.58-5.79 0.31-4.71 0.19-4.04 0.15-3.79 
Ward B2 
64-69 yrs 0.64-5.34 0.01-1.85 0.00-1.13 0.00-0.82 0.00-0.64 0.00-0.58 
70-74 yrs 0.62-5.22 0.01-1.80 0.00-1.09 0.00-0.79 0.00-0.62 0.00-0.56 
75-79 yrs 0.64-5.25 0.01-1.81 0.00-1.10 0.00-0.80 0.00-0.62 0.00-0.56 
80-84 yrs 0.37- 4.65 0.00-1.53 0.00-0.92 0.00-0.65 0.00-0.51 0.00-0.45 
>84 yrs 0.22-4.68 0.00-1.55 0.00-0.93 0.00-0.66 0.00-0.51 0.00-0.46 
Ward C 
64-69 yrs 0.69-4.45 0.02-1.45 0.00-0.86 0.00-0.61 0.00-0.47 0.00-0.42 
70-74 yrs 0.66-4.69 0.01-1.55 0.00-0.93 0.00-0.66 0.00-0.51 0.00-0.46 
75-79 yrs 0.72-4.40 0.02-1.42 0.00-0.84 0.00-0.60 0.00-0.46 0.00-0.41 
80-84 yrs 0.38-3.76 0.00-1.15 0.00-0.66 0.00-0.46 0.00-0.35 0.00-0.31 




Table 4.10: Probability (%) of Incurring Catastrophic Expenditures for Ischemic Heart Diseases 
 
 Age group >S$10,000 >S$30,000 >S$50,000 >S$70,000 >S$90,000 >S$100,000 
Ward A 
64-69 yrs 10.95-25.21 3.58-15.32 1.93-12.15 1.25-10.43 0.88-9.31 0.76-8.88 
70-74 yrs 11.73- 24.85 4.08-15.03 2.28-11.89 1.51-10.20 1.09-9.09 0.94-8.66 
75-79 yrs 12.95-32.61 4.91-21.75 2.88-18.02 1.97-15.92 1.47-14.51 1.29-13.96 
80-84 yrs 10.52-20.32 3.33-11.43 1.76-8.74 1.12-7.33 0.78-6.43 0.67-6.08 
>84 yrs 8.92-15.03 2.43-7.58 1.18-5.51 0.70-4.47 0.47-3.82 0.39-3.58 
Ward B1 
64-69 yrs 9.57-26.83 2.78-16.68 1.40-13.37 0.86-11.56 0.58-10.37 0.49-9.91 
70-74 yrs 8.41-22.39 2.17-13.04 1.02-10.14 0.60-8.60 0.39-7.60 0.32-7.21 
75-79 yrs 8.19-18.42 2.07-10.00 0.96-7.53 0.55-6.24 0.36-5.43 0.30-5.12 
80-84 yrs 7.00-17.28 1.53-9.17 0.65-6.82 0.35-5.62 0.22-4.86 0.18-4.57 
>84 yrs 5.58-13.10 0.99-6.29 0.37-4.47 0.19-3.57 0.11-3.02 0.08-2.81 
Ward B2 
64-69 yrs 1.67-10.26 0.09-4.51 0.02-3.08 0.01-2.39 0.00-1.98 0.00-1.83 
70-74 yrs 1.46-8.87 0.07-3.70 0.01-2.46 0.00-1.88 0.00-1.54 0.00-1.42 
75-79 yrs 1.04-7.47 0.04-2.93 0.01-1.89 0.00-1.42 0.00-1.15 0.00-1.05 
80-84 yrs 0.51-5.90 0.01-2.12 0.00-1.32 0.00-0.96 0.00-0.76 0.00-0.69 
>84 yrs 0.35-5.87 0.00-2.11 0.00-1.31 0.00-0.96 0.00-0.76 0.00-0.68 
Ward C 
64-69 yrs 2.26-8.58 0.17-3.53 0.04-2.34 0.01-1.78 0.01-1.46 0.00-1.34 
70-74 yrs 1.90-7.72 0.12-3.06 0.02-1.99 0.01-1.50 0.00-1.21 0.00-1.11 
75-79 yrs 0.92-5.69 0.03-2.02 0.00-1.25 0.00-0.91 0.00-0.72 0.00-0.65 
80-84 yrs 1.10-5.86 0.04-2.10 0.01-1.31 0.00-0.95 0.00-0.75 0.00-0.68 
>84 yrs 0.31-4.22 0.00-1.35 0.00-0.79 0.00-0.56 0.00-0.43 0.00-0.38 
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Table 4.11: Probability (%) of Incurring Catastrophic Expenditures for Injuries   
 
 Age group >S$10,000 >S$30,000 >S$50,000 >S$70,000 >S$90,000 >S$100,000 
Ward A 
64-69 yrs 10.34-16.50 3.22-8.61 1.69-6.36 1.06-5.21 0.74-4.49 0.63-4.22 
70-74 yrs 11.25-18.20 3.77-9.83 2.06-7.39 1.34-6.12 0.96-5.31 0.83-5.01 
75-79 yrs 10.65-14.29 3.40-7.07 1.81-5.10 1.15-4.11 0.81-3.50 0.69-3.27 
80-84 yrs 10.63-21.00 3.39-11.95 1.80-9.20 1.15-7.74 0.80-6.80 0.69-6.44 
>84 yrs 10.54-19.07 3.33-10.48 1.76-7.93 1.12-6.60 0.78-5.76 0.67-5.44 
Ward B1 
64-69 yrs 9.05-20.14 2.50-11.29 1.22-8.63 0.73-7.22 0.49-6.33 0.41-5.99 
70-74 yrs 9.75-21.85 2.88-12.61 1.46-9.77 0.90-8.25 0.62-7.28 0.52-6.90 
75-79 yrs 9.11-19.76 2.53-11.00 1.24-8.38 0.75-7.00 0.50-6.12 0.42-5.79 
80-84 yrs 10.25-25.14 3.16-15.26 1.65-12.10 1.04-10.39 0.72-9.27 0.61-8.83 
>84 yrs 8.09-20.41 2.02-11.50 0.93-8.80 0.54-7.38 0.35-6.47 0.29-6.13 
Ward B2 
64-69 yrs 1.49-7.82 0.07-3.12 0.01-2.03 0.00-1.53 0.00-1.24 0.00-1.14 
70-74 yrs 1.50-7.79 0.07-3.10 0.01-2.02 0.00-1.52 0.00-1.23 0.00-1.13 
75-79 yrs 1.31-7.91 0.06-3.17 0.01-2.07 0.00-1.56 0.00-1.27 0.00-1.16 
80-84 yrs 1.51-8.22 0.07-3.33 0.01-2.19 0.00-1.66 0.00-1.35 0.00-1.24 
>84 yrs 1.06-8.03 0.04-3.23 0.01-2.11 0.00-1.60 0.00-1.30 0.00-1.19 
Ward C 
64-69 yrs 1.30-5.30 0.06-1.84 0.01-1.12 0.00-0.81 0.00-0.64 0.00-0.57 
70-74 yrs 1.66-6.62 0.09-2.48 0.02-1.57 0.01-1.17 0.00-0.93 0.00-0.85 
75-79 yrs 1.48-5.86 0.07-2.10 0.01-1.30 0.00-0.95 0.00-0.75 0.00-0.68 
80-84 yrs 1.41-6.66 0.07-2.50 0.01-1.59 0.00-1.18 0.00-0.94 0.00-0.86 




4.5 Conclusion  
The risk of catastrophic health shock, though low, is a matter of great concern for the 
elderly, especially in systems like Singapore where individual responsibility for 
healthcare plays an important role. A sudden onset of a severe health shock may deplete 
the elderly household’s wealth much earlier than they would expect. In this essay, we 
predict the probability of experiencing catastrophic health shock by the elderly in 
Singapore. To this end, we fit both the lognormal and Pareto distributions to inpatient 
expenditure data of the elderly Singaporeans, conditional on demographic characteristics, 
ward class, complexity of illness, treatment severity, length of stay, survival status and 
insurance status and provide a range of probabilities of incurring huge inpatient 
expenditures. As in the third chapter, the model in this chapter can be adapted for out-of-
sample predictions through intercept adjustments as the expenditure profiles shift over 
time provided that the slope parameters remain the same.  
 
Our results indicate that the probability of catastrophic expenditure is higher for younger 
elderly compared to older elderly, for males compared to females and for the patients 
who die in the hospital. Another result that merit attention is that the insured are more at 
the risk of catastrophic expenditure compared to the uninsured. In case of the government 
insurance, this could possibly be due to self-selection bias as it is not mandatory to be 
insured. About 10% of the Singaporean population is not covered by MediShield or any 
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other MediShield approved plans (Ministry of Health, Singapore website
68
). Among the 
uninsured, a large proportion would be the elderly (Lim, 2005). It must be that the elderly 
who anticipate large health care expenses in future get catastrophic insurance coverage 
offered by the government and the elderly who expect to be relatively healthy do not take 
up insurance. This problem can be avoided if MediShield is made compulsory and 
universal.  
     
In private insurance market, higher risk of catastrophic expenditure for the insured could 
be due to a moral hazard problem. Although the elderly with payout from private 
insurance appears to be in a better health than the elderly without insurance cover, yet the 
risk of incurring huge inpatient expenses is greater for them than for the elderly without 
payout from private insurance, other things being equal. This could be due to the fact that 
the more generous private insurance, by lowering the effective price of health care to the 
insured users, encourages them to overuse health services. The evidence of a higher usage 
of services by people with insurance policies with more generous coverage has been 
found by Cameron et al. (1988), Newhouse et al. (1993), among others.  
 
A limitation of the study which also presents scope for improvement is that we have only 
cross-sectional data which prevents us from measuring life-time risk of catastrophic 
medical expenses. Although transitory health shocks generate most of the cross-sectional 
and short-term variance, it is the persistent shocks reflecting chronic conditions that 
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generate most of the life-time catastrophic health cost risk. It has been found that chronic 
conditions, both existing chronic health problems and new health events, contribute to 
wealth depletion for those aged 70 years and older in U.S. (Lee and Kim, 2008). 
Estimates show that that the real median wealth declines by 20.9% among married people 
70 years and older who enter nursing homes but increases by 19.7% for those who never 
receive home care (Johnson et al., 2006). Time series data is required to study the risk of 
such persistent (even though moderate) health expenses that accumulate into a 













Chapter 5: Optimal Deductible: A Simulation Approach 
5.1 Introduction  
The main function of health insurance is reduction of the financial risk associated with 
ill-health. However, as health insurance acts as an implicit subsidy to the utilization of 
health care it may cause consumers to use health services beyond the point at which their 
marginal value equals their opportunity cost, resulting in efficiency losses (Blomqvist, 
1997). This overutilization of health services by individuals in the presence of insurance 
is termed as a “moral hazard” problem.69 For example, an individual with a 20% 
coinsurance rate increases health spending until the last dollar of services brings a benefit 
that the individual values only at 20 cents. Since the cost of providing that dollar of 
services is a dollar, there is an 80 cents welfare loss on that last dollar of spending. 
Designing an optimal insurance policy, therefore, involves balancing gains from risk 
protection against losses resulting from distortion of behavior. Health insurance policies 
are usually written with various mixtures of deductibles, co-insurance, exclusions, 
restrictions on providers, limitations on treatments and procedures, ceilings on expenses, 
and special schedules, to curb the moral hazard problem. 
 
The issue of the optimal insurance (Zeckhauser, 1970; Arrow, 1976) was analyzed, 
mainly, theoretically until the Rand Health Insurance Experiment made available data on 
health care utilization of Americans under different insurance plans with varying degrees 
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 Moral hazard on the demand side is being referred here. It is known that moral hazard resulting from 
actions of consumers is of much less significance than that arising from physician-induced demand for 
medical care.      
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of cost sharing. An exception is a study by Feldstein (1973) that quantitatively finds the 
welfare gain from decreasing insurance in the U.S. If the average coinsurance rate is 
raised from 0.33 to 0.50 or 0.67, the net welfare gain (excess of the welfare gain from 
reduced price distortion over the welfare loss from increased risk bearing) ranges 
between $4.3 billion and $8.9 billion per year in 1969 for plausible values of parameters, 
i.e., low price elasticity of demand for medical care and demand shift parameter,
70
 high 
sensitivity of price to insurance, value of the absolute risk aversion coefficient  0.0003 
(in 1969 dollars). 
 
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) gave rise to a flurry of empirical papers 
analyzing this issue. A seminal paper by Manning et al. (1987), based on the Rand HIE 
data, estimates that the gross welfare loss from moving from the 95% coinsurance plan 
(with a cap on out-of-pocket expenses at $1,000) to the free care plan is in the range of 
$37 billion to $60 billion. The authors find that the average per capita expenses on the 
free plan are 46% higher than those on the 95% plan. However, there are no clinically 
significant health benefits from additional services for an average person between the two 
plans. Feldman and Dowd (1991) refine the estimate of the welfare loss provided by 
Manning et al. (1987) by accounting for gains from reduced risk bearing and insurance-
induced change in gross prices. Their findings suggest that the gain from reduced risk 
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 Feldstein’s calculation of the welfare loss of excess health insurance is based on the premise that the 
introduction of insurance raises the equilibrium gross price per patient day of medical care which may lead 
health care providers to improve the quality of medical services offered. The resulting increase in the 
quality of care, if any, shifts the demand curve and partly offsets the higher price. The demand shift 
parameter captures this increase in quality of medical care as perceived by patients and as measured by 
change in their willingness to pay for the original quantity of patient days relative to change in gross price. 
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bearing, though not inconsequential, is not large enough to outweigh the loss due to 
excess consumption of medical care. Assuming the value of the absolute risk aversion 
parameter to be 0.0036, insurance-induced increase in gross price of medical care to be  
20%, the welfare loss per family in 1984 dollars is estimated to be $1,795 and the gain 
from risk-bearing stands at $176 per family. This translates into the net welfare loss of 
$109.3 billion for all US households headed by persons under the age of 65 years.  
 
Furthermore, Buchanan et al. (1991), based on simulation results using the Rand HIE 
data, suggest that the “best” plan in terms of minimum waste from excess spending and 
risk borne by individuals is characterized by a small deductible and 25% coinsurance up 
to $1000 Maximum Dollar Expenditure (MDE) on out-of-pocket expenses while 
Manning and Marquis (1996) findings show that the coinsurance rate of 45% would be 
optimal for pure coinsurance plans without any stop-loss provision. 
 
The coinsurance rate is assumed to be constant in the aforementioned studies. Blomqvist 
(1997) extends the theory to non-linear insurance schedules, indicating that the 
magnitude of the welfare loss from excess health insurance may be significantly less 
under non-linear health insurance than estimated under the assumption of constant 
coinsurance rate. Almost full insurance for the small percentage of the severely ill and a 
relatively high coinsurance parameter for the majority of people not seriously ill would be 





These studies analyze the issue of the optimal insurance in terms of the optimal degree of 
coinsurance rate. These are based on the assumption that the nature of health insurance is 
such that it simply reimburses an individual a stipulated fraction of his/her medical 
expenses and the rest is borne by the individual. However, this assumption is at odds with 
reality because a health insurance plan usually includes a deductible and an upper limit 
besides the coinsurance rate.  
 
A deductible is the amount that must be paid before the benefits of the insurance policy 
apply. If there is a deductible, the policy also defines an accounting period, such as a 
year, at the end of which the consumer must again satisfy the deductible. Keeler et al. 
(1974) highlight three features of deductibles that make deductibles desirable. First, 
administrative costs appear to be nearly invariant to the size of the claim. As a result, 
insurance that covers larger claims is more attractive than insurance that covers smaller 
claims, because the payment ratio is higher. Second, the problem of adverse incentives 
may be more severe for small claims than for large. Specifically, if own-price elasticity 
falls with total expenditure, insuring large losses is relatively more attractive. Finally, 
deductibles are beneficial to risk-averse policyholders because they concentrate the 
benefits where they are needed the most, i.e., where the losses are the greatest. This 
feature forms the basis of Arrow’s result (1963) that the optimal insurance policy for a 
given premium for risk-averse consumers has no coinsurance after a deductible. 
However, one of the assumptions used to establish this result that demand is completely 




Furthermore, Keeler et al. (1974) show that the demand for medical services by a 
representative consumer as a function of the size of the deductible resembles a logistic 
curve. While the location of the curve will vary from individual to individual, each 
person should have (a) a region of “small” deductibles where the demand is inelastic 
because the consumer expects, with high probability, to exceed very small deductibles, 
and therefore, acts as if he had no deductible at all; (b) a middle region where the demand 
varies with the deductible; and (c) a region of “large” deductibles in which the demand is 
again inelastic because the consumer expects, with high probability, not to exceed very 
large deductibles and therefore, acts as if he had no insurance at all. It is suggested that 
there is likely to be little difference in either demand or administrative costs between 
“large” and “very large” deductibles (defined as deductibles in the upper range of the 
logistic curve); therefore, on grounds of risk, large deductibles are preferred to very large 
deductibles. In other words, it would appear that a deductible just above the region in 
which demand is sensitive to variations in the deductible is a local optimum. Moreover, 
below a certain level, further allocative effects from decreasing the deductible are small. 
Therefore, no deductible or a deductible slightly greater than zero (i.e., one in the lower 
portion of the logistic curve) is also likely to be a local optimum, if claim processing or 
other administrative costs are not large. The global optimum is likely to be one of these 
two local optima but other considerations (such as the amount of the demand change, the 
variation in administrative costs and the degree of risk aversion) need to be known before 




In a recent study, Kleef et al. (2009) argue that the traditional deductible is, in theory, not 
effective in reducing moral hazard for high-risk individuals who know (ex ante) that their 
expenditures will exceed the deductible amount d. To increase the effectiveness of a 
deductible, they propose to shift the deductible range from [0,d] to [si, si+d] with starting 
point si  depending on relevant risk characteristics of individual i. This is an interesting 
result but for individuals with different risk characteristics. In our study, we restrict the 
range to the conventional case of uniform risk across all individuals.         
 
In the present essay, we revisit the problem of the optimal deductible in health insurance 
which represents a variant of the literature on the optimal degree of cost sharing in 
insurance. A simulation model is developed to determine the size of the optimal 
deductible. This is done both for the non-elderly families enrolled under the Rand HIE 
using their health expenditure data and for the elderly in Singapore using their 
hospitalization expenditure data.   
 
This paper makes a contribution to the existing empirical literature on the optimal degree 
of cost sharing in health insurance by estimating the size of the optimal deductible for the 
elderly in Singapore. None of the existing studies have looked into this issue in the 
context of Singapore. The significance of the issue derives from the fact that a significant 
proportion of the elderly are not insured in Singapore. In year 2010, roughly 10% of the 
population was not covered by the government
71
 or any other private health insurance 
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 The government insurance, termed as “MediShield”, is a catastrophic insurance offered by the 
government on an opt-out basis to all Singaporeans 75 years and below. The coverage is up to the age of 85 
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(Ministry of Health, Singapore website
72
). Among the uninsured, a large proportion 
would be elderly (Lim, 2005). In our sample, only 22% of the elderly had payout from 
the government insurance.
73
 One of the reasons for low uptake of the government 
insurance by the elderly may be that it is characterized by high deductibles. For the 
lowest ward class (ward C) in public hospitals in Singapore,
74
 the deductible is S$1,000 
for those aged 80 years and below while it is S$2,000 for those between 81-85 years. The 
findings of this paper would allow us to make an informed judgment on whether the 
deductible component of the government insurance is welfare-maximizing or not.  
 
Another contribution of the paper is that it highlights the difference in attitudes towards 
health-related risks and financial risks. In the health insurance literature, much higher 
values of the risk aversion parameter are chosen compared to the macroeconomics 
literature. It demonstrates empirically that the optimal deductible can be very different 
depending on the value of the risk aversion parameter. For the Rand data, the optimal 
deductible is $100 for the relative risk aversion coefficient of 15, which jumps to $1,000 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
years. The deductibles are kept high as it intends to cover catastrophic illnesses. The premiums are 
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 There are five ward classes in public hospitals in Singapore- A, B1, B2 plus, B2 and C- stratified 
according to level of amenities and subsidy from the government. In ward C, up to 80% of the hospital cost 
is subsidized while ward A does not receive any subsidy. Subsidy rate varies between 10 to 20% in ward 
B1 and between 50 to 65% in ward B2. In terms of amenities, ward A has the maximum amenities while 




for the risk aversion coefficient of 2. For the Singapore case, the corresponding values are 
S$1,000 and S$3,000, respectively.     
 
The plan for the essay is as follows: Section 5.2 presents a theoretical model of the 
optimal deductible in health insurance. Section 5.3 is devoted to determining the optimal 
deductible from the Rand HIE data. This involves three subsections. Subsection 5.3.1 
succinctly describes the Rand HIE; Subsection 5.3.2 outlines operational specification of 
the simulation model applied to the data, and Subsection 5.3.3 presents the results on the 
optimal deductible from the Rand data. In Section 5.4, the optimal deductible for the 
elderly Singaporean is simulated. It comprises the following subsections: Subsection 
5.4.1 briefly describes data on hospitalization expenditures of the elderly Singaporeans; 
Subsection 5.4.2 presents details of operational implementation of the simulation model 
for the Singapore case and Subsection 5.4.3 tabulates the results on the optimal 
deductible for the Singaporean elderly under different parameter assumptions. Section 5.5 
concludes.   
 
5.2 The Theoretical Model 
Theoretical models on the optimal deductible have to take into account two conflicting 
objectives associated with insurance: one is to protect against the financial risk of illness 
and the other is to reduce overutilization of medical care.  
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In the model formulated below, the expected utility approach
75
 is followed to capture 
choice under uncertainty. The only uncertainty in our model is the incidence of a health 
shock in a year. All consumers are assumed to be identical. With identical consumers, the 
problem of finding the insurance plan that maximizes the expected utility of a 
representative (risk-averse) consumer is equivalent to finding the plan that maximizes a 
utilitarian social welfare function.  
 
A representative (risk-averse) individual’s utility, u, depends on his consumption, c, and 
his after treatment health, h, i.e., 
 hcUu ,            (5.1) 
where  
    .0,;,0;0,;0,  cUhUUUUU hchhcchc  
Suppose that the representative individual faces a range of potential health shocks, , 
with  distributed with density function f(). The individual’s health shock, , will 
determine his medical care utilization, m. A health transition equation translates medical 
consumption, m, initial health, h0 and health shock, , into health: 
 mhHh ,,0           (5.2)  
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 There has been a debate over the ability of the conventional expected utility theory to explain most risk 
attitudes that economists study, especially modest-scale risk aversion. Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue that 
the theory indeed captures some of the intuition for risk aversion over large stakes. However, it cannot be 
used to explain risk aversion over moderate stakes. According to the theory, risk attitudes derive solely 
from changes in marginal utility associated with fluctuations in lifetime wealth. Hence, the theory says that 
people will not be averse to risks involving monetary gains and losses that do not alter lifetime wealth 






















Better initial health implies better health this period; medical spending has a positive 
effect on health and health shocks have a negative effect on health.  Furthermore, it is 
assumed that no consumer will have more than one health shock in a year. This 




The consumer’s income, y, is assumed to be exogenously given; and that he can neither 
borrow nor lend. Both c and m are assumed to be priced at unity. Assume now that the 
consumer is covered under a health insurance plan that specifies some deductible, d. To 
reiterate, a deductible is the amount that the consumer must pay before the insurance 
becomes effective. The coinsurance is assumed to be zero, that is, the insurer covers the 
entire monetary cost [m(θ) - d] once the deductible is satisfied.   
 
In addition to the monetary cost, there is a non-monetary cost involved in the utilization 
of health services in the form of time, discomfort and pain. The non-monetary cost is 
assumed to be some fraction say, x, of the monetary cost.
77
 Thus, the true total cost in 
each health state is the monetary plus the non-monetary cost and the true marginal price 
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 Here we only consider the consumer’s choice in the presence of the deductible in one-period case 
wherein the consumer does not consider the impact of his current decision to utilize medical care on the 
expected cost of future medical care that may arise due to unanticipated future health shocks. The multi-
period case wherein the consumer takes into account the effect of his current purchases of medical care on 
the expected cost of future medical care is formulated as a sequential decision problem in Keeler et al., 
1974 and 1977. When uncertainty about future health state is present, any expenditure in the range below 
the deductible has the bonus of reducing the expected costs of future medical care; and the greater the 
chance that future expenditures will exceed the deductible, the cheaper today’s visit to the doctor. 
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 This assumption is crucial to the analysis, given our specification of the utility function. If not for this 





is (1+x) when the deductible is not satisfied and (x) when it is. The consumer’s budget 













      (5.3) 
where π is the insurance premium. Note that the budget line is kinked as shown in Figure 
5.1 since the marginal price of m changes once the deductible is reached with purchase of 
a certain number of units of m. 
 
Assume that the individual treats the insurance premium as fixed- nothing he does will 
raise or lower his insurance premium that year. Also, assume that individuals are not 
penalized in future years for additional medical spending this year as expected future 
changes in costs are spread equally over everyone in the group. The consumer will 
choose medical care utilization to maximize utility when sick. Thus, he will choose m
#
() 
as the m that maximizes utility in (5.1) subject to the budget constraint in (5.3), given the 
knowledge of . The solution to this maximization problem will depend on the specific  
the individual has realized.   
 
Given health shock 1, the solution for m is determined by the tangency of the 
indifference curve with the kinked budget line at point A, where the following first order 
condition
78
 (FOC) with respect to m is satisfied   
  eachforUxUH chm  1       (5.4)  
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The L.H.S. of equation (5.4) represents the gain in utility from spending another dollar on 
medical care; it is the product of the effect of medical care on health and the effect of 
health on utility. The R.H.S. is the utility cost to the individual from spending that dollar; 
it is the product of the out-of-pocket cost of medical care and the utility loss from 
foregoing that dollar for consumption.
 
The solution point A lies in the range where the 
deductible has not yet been satisfied and, therefore, the consumer pays the entire cost 
(monetary plus non-monetary).  
 
Another health shock, 2>1, alters the indifference curves and leads the consumer to 
purchase sufficient medical care to satisfy the deductible as shown by solution value B. 
At point B, the following FOC with respect to m is satisfied 
eachforxUUH chm         (5.5)                                        
 
In this case, the consumer only bears the non-monetary cost since the deductible has been 
paid. Given the kinked budget line for any d, there exists, by continuity, some health 
shock d that will place the consumer at a point of indifference between two different 
pairs of c and m
79
. Keeler et al. (1974) show that, in the one-period case, consumers with 
smooth indifference curves would never be observed purchasing exactly d units of 
medical care and, in general, would not be near the kink in the budget line. In fact, a 
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 The analysis of the choice made by the ill consumer facing a deductible is adapted from Keeler et al., 




consumer who knowingly purchases care near the kink must have an indifference curve 





Figure 5.1: An Insurance Plan with Deductible d 




With a kinked budget line, the points where the indifference curve is tangent to the 
budget line are only local optima. With a normal utility function, the overall optimum for 
the consumer is easily found by means of the critical level of health shock d. All health 
shocks less severe than d will result in m less than d, and health shocks more severe than 
d will lead to m greater than d.     
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 In Keeler et al. (1974), the price elasticity of demand, , of such a consumer is shown to satisfy 
 
, where m is the distance from the actual purchase to the kink, m is the 
amount purchased, and  is the coinsurance rate after the deductible is satisfied. 
















At the time the consumer is seeking medical care, he alone knows the health shock. The 
planner cannot observe , however. The ex ante expected utility for the insured consumer 
is  
      dfmhHcUUE )())(,,(, 0       (5.6) 
where m() is the quantity of medical care an individual with condition   chooses to 
receive.  
 
The insurer will seek to find the deductible d that produces the maximum possible 
expected utility with:  
          dfmhHxmdyUMaxUE d )()(,,,)(
#
0
#*    (5.7) 
where m
#
 is defined as the solution to equation (5.5). Since the insurer cannot determine 
the individual’s health state, he/she cannot differentiate payments on the basis of health 
shock.
81
    
 
An additional constraint operates on the insurer- premiums must cover expected costs, 
that is, an actuarially fair insurance. Thus,   
    dfdm )()(
#         (5.8)                                                        
The solution to the above maximization problem would yield an optimal actuarially fair 
deductible that maximizes expected utility subject to the constraint that the individuals 
                                                 
 
81 
To ensure that households will choose their health services spending in such a way that the optimal 
solution is, in fact, implemented, self-selection constraints are invoked. The self-selection constraint is 
imposed to guarantee that the insured by their choice of m truthfully reveal their value of .  It ensures that 
an individual facing a deductible d will, in fact, for a given , utilize health services m# that corresponds to 




act in a self-interested fashion, that is, moral hazard operates. Such a policy would 
essentially be a second best.    
  
The analytical solution to the above problem is complicated. Therefore, we develop a 
simulation model to arrive at the value of the optimal deductible. This is done for the 
non-elderly families enrolled under the Rand HIE in the next section and for the elderly 
Singaporeans in Section 5.4.  
 
5.3 Optimal Deductible for Non-elderly Families under Rand HIE  
5.3.1 Description of Rand HIE  
Rand HIE enrolled around 2000 non-elderly families from late 1974 to early 1977 in six 
areas of the U.S.- Dayton, Ohio; Seattle, Washington; Fitchburg, Massachusetts; Franklin 
County, Massachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; and Georgetown County, South 
Carolina (Newhouse, J.P. and the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). These 
participating families were assigned to one of the fourteen fee-for-service insurance plans 
for either three or five years. These insurance plans had different levels of cost sharing 
that varied along two dimensions- the coinsurance rate which is the fraction of bill paid 
by the participant and the Maximum Dollar Expenditure (MDE) which is an upper limit 
on family out-of-pocket expenditures during a 12-month accounting period. There were 
four coinsurance percentages- 0 (free care), 25, 50, and 95- and three levels of the MDE- 
5, 10, or 15% of family income, up to a maximum of $1000. Beyond the MDE, the 
insurance plan reimbursed all covered expenses in full. Almost all medical services were 
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covered. Various combinations of these coinsurance rates and MDE levels yielded most 
of the insurance plans. However, there were a few exceptional plans. One such plan had 
different coinsurance rates for inpatient and ambulatory medical services (25%) than for 
dental and ambulatory mental health services (50%). Another plan had 95% coinsurance 
for outpatient services and 0% coinsurance (free care) for inpatient services and the MDE 
of $150 per person, subject to a maximum of $450 per family.        
5.3.2 Operational Implementation 
(a) In order to simulate the choice of the deductible, the representative household’s82 
utility is assumed to be given by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
83
 (CRRA) 

















u     (5.9) 
where a is the standard weighting factor, γ is related to the elasticity of 
substitution given by (1/1-γ) and is the constant coefficient of relative risk 
aversion.  
 
The health transition function is assumed to be  
  mhh 0         (5.10) 
Substituting (5.10) into (5.9) yields,   
                                                 
 
82 
For numerical simulations, the unit of analysis is the household rather than the individual since the 
available Rand data is on family medical expenses. 
 
83 
The CRRA functional form is popular in literature because its positive third derivative implies a positive 






















   (5.11)          
 
(b) The parameters (a and γ) of the utility function are calibrated using the mean 
medical expenditures observed in the 25% and 95% insurance plans in the Rand 
HIE
84
, estimate of the price elasticity of demand for medical care calculated from 
annual expenditures
85,86 




(c)  As mentioned above, the true total cost in each health state includes both the 
monetary and the non-monetary cost of seeking health care. We set the non-
monetary cost at 20% of the monetary cost. With this assumption, true marginal 
price facing the household is 20% plus 0.16  80% under the 25% plan, 20% plus 
0.31  80% under the 95% plan and 20% under the free plan.    
 
(d)   The health shock distribution () is calibrated from the frequency distribution of 
family medical expenses (source: Manning et al., 1988, Appendix B, Table B.6) 
                                                 
 
84
 The mean expenditures in the 25% and 95% plans are $1,454 and $1,218 (in 1984 U.S. dollars), 
respectively (source: Manning et al., 1988, Appendix B, Table B.6). 
 
85
 The price elasticity of demand for total medical services in 25-95% plans is found to be -0.14 (source: 
Manning et al., 1987, Table 9). 
 
86
 Note that the use of average coinsurance rate to calculate elasticity yields biased estimate of elasticity. 
For small total expenditures, the true coinsurance rate is well above the average rate (the MDE has not been 
exceeded), whereas for large expenditures (those exceeding the MDE), reverse holds true. However, this 
should not affect our calibrated values of a and γ. 
 
87
 The average coinsurance rate is the aggregate amount paid out-of-pocket divided by aggregate total 
expenditure. The average coinsurance rate in the 25% plan was 16% compared with 31% on the 95% plan. 
Thus, although the nominal coinsurance rate in the 95% plan was nearly four times as high as in the 25% 
plan, the average coinsurance was only twice as great (source: Manning et al., 1987, Table 9).  
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observed in the Rand free insurance plan. Prior to the calibration exercise, a 
couple of adjustments to the frequency distribution of medical expenses in the 
free plan are made. The first adjustment involves reallocating frequencies from 
upper quantile intervals to lower quantile intervals of the distribution to account 
for the possibility that some of the observations in the upper quantile intervals of 
the distribution were families who had suffered more than one illness episode. 
This is done to reflect the distribution of illness episodes rather than the 
distribution of annual expenditure.
88
 The second adjustment corrects for the fact 
that once the upper limit on out-of-pocket expenses is reached in the 95% plan, 
the distribution of expenses should be same in both the 95% and the free plan. 
 
(e) The initial health h0 is fixed at zero. 
 
(f) The value of income (y) is set at $24031, equal to the mean annual family income 
in the U.S. in 1984.
89
   
 
(g)   For the same insurance policy, persons with a higher risk aversion parameter will 
demand more insurance and be willing to pay higher premiums than less risk-
averse individuals. The true risk aversion parameter is unknown, but presumably 
exists because individuals are observed purchasing insurance at a cost greater than 
its expected value (Huang et al., 1989). There has been a huge variation in values 
                                                 
 
88
 This correction is consistent with the implicit assumption in Manning et al. (1988) that the percentage 
insurance coverage is based on cost of each disease episode, not on annual expenditure. 
 
89
 All the Rand medical expenditure data and family income are measured in 1984 U.S. dollar.    
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of the risk aversion parameter used in different strands of literature. Consistent 
with the literature on health insurance (Friedman, 1974; Marquis and Holmer, 
1996; Manning and Marquis, 1996), we assume a relatively high value of the 
relative risk aversion coefficient of 15.
90
 However, we also conduct a sensitivity 
analysis with a lower value of the relative risk aversion coefficient of 2, often 
used in macroeconomics literature (Zeldes, 1989; Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 
1995; Attanasio et al., 1999; Cagetti and DeNardi, 2006) and an intermediate 
value of 8.    
 
5.3.3 Numerical Results  
The optimal or the welfare maximizing deductible is the actuarially fair deductible that 
generates the maximum expected utility subject to the constraint that the household acts 
in a self-interested fashion. In other words, the optimal deductible balances the value of 
risk reduction from more complete insurance with efficiency losses associated with moral 
hazard. 
 
Using the calibrated values of a and γ and the distribution of s, the choice of the optimal 
deductible is simulated. The health shock θ is set at twelve different values with 
                                                 
 
90
 The value of the absolute risk aversion parameter used by Friedman (1974) is 0.00039 (in 1995 U.S. 
dollars) which is equivalent to the relative risk aversion coefficient of 13.53. Marquis and Holmer’s (1996) 
estimated value of the absolute risk aversion parameter of 0.00046 (in 1995 U.S. dollar) corresponds to the 
relative risk aversion coefficient of 15.96 and Manning and Marquis’s (1996) value of 0.0021 (in 1995 U.S. 
dollar) corresponds to the relative risk aversion coefficient of 7.28.  
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frequencies fi on the basis of a calibration exercise as shown in Table 5.1
91
. The 
simulation results on the optimal deductible are presented in Table 5.2. Refer to 
Appendix D for steps involved in the calibration of a and γ and s and Appendix E for the 
methodology followed for computing the optimal deductible values. 
 
The optimal deductible for the relative risk aversion coefficient of 15 is $100 while the 
risk aversion coefficients of 8 and 2 yield much higher deductible of $1,000 each. Same 
values of the optimal deductible for the risk aversion coefficients of 8 and 2 could be an 
artifact of the assumption of a discrete set of  values. 
 
In the next section, the size of the optimal deductible for the elderly in Singapore is 
simulated using the data on the distribution of bill size of hospitalization episodes of the 
elderly. 
  
                                                 
 
91
 The negative values of health shock θ are result of the calibration exercise. Blomqvist (1999) also finds a 
negative value of health shock θ from the calibration using the Rand Data.  
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Table 5.1: Distribution of s from Health Expenditure Distribution under Rand free Plan 
 
fi 0.1 0.105 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.107 0.071 0.07 0.035 0.03 0.01 
i -5497.4 -5068.1 -4701.7 -4282.9 -4178.2 -4073.5 -3968.8 -3755.7 -1979.6 772.5 6961.6 19274 
 
 




aversion coefficient = 15 
Relative risk 
aversion coefficient = 8 
Relative risk 
























100 791 799 1,000 544 612 1,000 544 612 
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5.4 Optimal Deductible for the Elderly, Singapore  
5.4.1 Description of Data 
Data is extracted from hospital bills of the elderly (64 years and over) who were admitted 
in a tertiary public hospital in Singapore over the period Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007. The cross-
sectional data contains information on patient’s demographics, length of stay, ward class, 
primary and secondary diagnoses, outcome of hospitalization, itemized inpatient 
expenses and modes of financing. The total number of hospitalization episodes recorded 
is 31,246. To simplify simulation, we restrict to hospitalization episodes of the elderly, 
aged at most 80 years, in the lowest ward class i.e., ward class C. There were 7,400 such 
episodes. 4,600 episodes had no payout from insurance (both the government and private) 
and 2,840 had payout from insurance. We refer to episodes had no payout from insurance 
as uninsured and had payout from insurance as insured for ease of exposition.  
 
5.4.2 Operational Implementation  
(a) The parameters of utility function (a and γ) are calibrated using the distributions 
of inpatient bill size of the uninsured and insured elderly in ward class C and the 
price elasticity of the demand for medical care services. Following Huang et al. 
(1989), the price elasticity of the demand for medical care services for the elderly 
is set at -0.  The value is higher than those obtained from the Rand data which 
covers only the non-elderly. It is argued (Huang et al., 1989 and Finkelstein, 
2007) that the elderly due to their retirement status, low income and perceived 
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higher sensitivity to medical care prices
92,93
 tend to have greater medical price 
elasticities. For sensitivity analysis, higher values of the price elasticity of -0.4, -
0.5, -0.7 and -0.9 are chosen.     
(b) The distribution of bill size of hospitalization episodes of the uninsured elderly 
admitted in the ward class C of a public hospital in Singapore is used to calibrate 
the distribution of health shock. The hospitalization expenditure distribution is 
positively skewed with a mean of S$1,194 and a median of S$654. 
(c) The initial health h0 is fixed at zero. 
(d) The median annual income of the household with the head of the household 60 
years and older is used as a measure of the income of the elderly, y. In Singapore, 
that amount was S$24,000 in 2007 (Department of Statistics, Singapore)  
(e) The price of medical care is normalized to unity for ease of simulation.  
(f) The coinsurance rate is set at 0.20.  
(g) The non-monetary cost of seeking medical care for the elderly is assumed to be 
10% of total monetary cost, lower than that for the non-elderly. The reason being 
that since the elderly are retired, the time cost is not very significant (Huang et al., 
1989).  
(h) The relative risk aversion coefficient is set at 15. The smaller values of risk 
aversion of 8 and 2 are used in sensitivity check.  
                                                 
 
92
 Huang and Koropecky (1976) find that, for ambulatory care services, the price elasticity of the demand 
for the elderly varies from -0.37 to -0.78.   
 
93
 Finkelstein (2007), using variation in pre-existing levels of insurance coverage before Medicare was 
introduced, finds a huge response of spending to the provision of insurance coverage, with an implied 
elasticity that is six times larger than in the Rand data. This suggests either that the elderly are more price-





(i) For the Singapore case, we account a the loading fee94, , in simulation. A higher 
value of  indicates a higher administrative cost of insurance. Huang et al. (1989) 
claim that insurance policies for the elderly are usually characterized by higher 
loading fee since they are more expensive individual-type policies. The 
proportional loading fee is set at 0.35. The sensitivity analysis is conducted with 




5.4.3 Numerical Results  
As mentioned above, the comparative statics of the model is simulated by varying base 
case parameters over a plausible range. The following parameters are varied: the price 
elasticity of demand for medical care (-0.3 to -0.9), loading fee (0.35 to 0.09) and the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (15 to 2). The calibrated distributions of health shocks 
for chosen medical care price elasticities are reported in Table 5.3. Using the calibrated 
values of a and γ and the distribution of  in the simulation model, the values of the 
optimal deductible are obtained under various parameter assumptions and are presented 
in Table 5.4. For the base case (price elasticity of demand -0.3, loading fee 0.35, risk 
aversion coefficient 15), the optimal deductible is S$1000. For a higher value of the price 
elasticity of demand for medical care, the optimal deductible is expected to be larger. 
However, we do not get the expected pattern in the optimal deductible values with an 
increase in the price elasticity of demand for medical care because the distribution of 
                                                 
 
94
 A loading fee is defined as the percentage of premium marked up over the expected coverage loss by the 
insurer to cover costs of insurance administration and profit margin. 
 
95
 Feldstein and Friedman (1977) assume a loading fee of 0.09, Rosett and Huang (1973) set it at 0.17, and 
Keeler et al. (1977) at 0.35. Phelps (1997) uses 0.18 in 1990 for commercial firms selling group insurance. 
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health shock is recalibrated for each estimate of the price elasticity. As a result, values of 
the optimal deductible across different price elasticities (for a given risk aversion 
coefficient) are not comparable.  
 
The optimal deductible decreases as risk aversion increases. For a risk aversion 
coefficient of 15 (price elasticity of demand -0.3, loading fee 0.35), the optimal 
deductible is S$1,000 and for a risk aversion coefficient of 2, the optimal deductible is 
S$3,000. This result holds for other combinations of demand elasticity and loading fee.  
 
There is hardly any variation in the deductible with respect to the proportional loading 
fee. The rise in the loading fee is reflected in higher premiums.        
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Table 5.3: Distributions of s for Different Medical Care Price Elasticites, Singapore  
fi 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.04 0.01 
i 
 (e=-0.3)  
-615.47 -422.85 -334.88 -246.51 -142.38 -11.40 161.82 507.57 1383.94 2655.05 5379.93 23387.60 
i 
(e=-0.4) 
-125.48 62.94 148.98 235.42 337.27 465.39 634.84 973.03 1830.26 3073.61 5738.97 23353.32 
i  
(e=-0.5) 
12.00 199.23 284.73 370.63 471.84 599.16 767.54 1103.62 1955.48 3191.04 5839.70 23343.70 
i  
(e=-0.7) 
99.59 286.07 371.23 456.78 557.59 684.40 852.10 1186.83 2035.27 3265.86 5903.89 23337.58 
i  
(e=-0.9) 
125.70 311.96 397.01 482.47 583.15 709.81 877.31 1211.64 2059.05 3288.17 5923.02 23335.75 
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15 1,000 1,006 1,570 1,000 874 1,575 1,000 816 1,578 
8 1,300 822 1,484 1,300 714 1,488 1,300 666 1,490 
2 3,000 393 1,358 3,000 341 1,359 3,000 318 1,360 
-0.4 
15 1,000 998 1,577 800 1,015 1,668 800 945 1,670 
8 1,200 837 1,499 1,200 726 1,492 1,200 677 1,493 
2 2,900 394 1,361 2,900 342 1,361 2,900 318 1,362 
-0.5 
15 900 1,030 1,580 800 1,014 1,670 800 946 1,672 
8 1,200 835 1,492 1,200 724 1,493 1,200 675 1,494 
2 2,900 393 1,361 2,900 340 1,362 2,900 317 1,362 
-0.7 
15 900 1,029 1,581 900 893 1,583 900 833 1,584 
8 1,200 833 1,493 1,200 723 1,494 1,200 674 1,494 
2 2,900 392 1,362 2,900 339 1,362 2,900 316 1,362 
-0.9 
15 900 1,028 1,581 900 893 1,583 900 832 1,584 
8 1,200 833 1,493 1,200 722 1,494 1,200 673 1,494 





Most countries have witnessed escalating health care costs over the past few decades. The 
spread of health insurance has frequently been cited to be a significant cause of a rapid 
rise in health spending (Feldstein, 1971, 1977; Finkelstein, 2007). Consequently, new and 
innovative ways are being explored to control the increase in health costs resulting from 
the growth of health insurance. These include, among others, deductibles, coinsurance, 
upper limits on maximum claimable amount, etc. In this essay, we study the issue of the 
optimal deductible and simulate numerical values of the optimal deductible under 
different parameter assumptions. This is done for both the non-elderly families enrolled 
under the Rand HIE and the elderly in Singapore.  
 
A finding of study that deserves a mention here is that, for Singapore, the optimal 
deductible for the base case parameters turns out to be S$1,000 which is equal to the 
value of the deductible of the catastrophic health insurance policy of the Singapore 
government. Thus, the deductible component of the government insurance policy, even 
though perceived to be large, appears optimal from an economic perspective.  
 
Another insight from the study is that the value of the optimal deductible depends vastly 
on the value of the risk aversion coefficient. This underscores the importance of using the 
right magnitude of the risk aversion in determining the welfare maximizing deductible. 
Designing experiments to study the health-related risky behavior of individuals and 
deducing a more accurate value of the risk aversion parameter is an important unfinished 
task.          
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In interpreting these results, it is important to bear in mind that the simulation approach, 
though quite cost-effective in providing guidance to policy making, can be very sensitive 





Appendix A  
A.1 Picking a Model: Box-Cox test 
To determine an appropriate transformation, obtain the MLE of ρ from          


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Y
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Some specific cases  
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A.2 Checking for Heteroscedasticity: Park test- GLM version 
Model: 
iii xY  

)ln(  
• Use least square residuals on log scale to create d 
•  Estimate lnvar on  xi’s by GLM (gamma, log link) 




A.3 Checking Model Fit for Linearity: Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
To check fit on scale of interest or raw scale for systematic bias 
• Estimate model (e.g., glm Yi or OLS iii xY  

)ln( ) 
• Retransform to get iYˆ on raw scale 
• Compute raw-scale residuals iii YYr
ˆ   
• Create 10 groups, sorted by specific xi (or by iYˆ ) 
• F-test of whether all 10 mean residuals different from zero 
• Look for systematic patterns (e.g., U-shaped or N-shaped pattern) 
 
A.4 Test of Overfitting: Copas Test 
• Randomly split sample into two sub-sample A and B 
• Estimate model on sample A, retain coefficients Aˆ   
• Forecast to sample B 





ˆ   
• Regression model for sample B 




i YY  
ˆ
10  
• Test 1ˆ1   






A.5 Marginal and Incremental Effects 
Let Y be a n×1 response variable and X be a n×k matrix giving n observations on k 
covariates X1 to Xk.. For the mean function µ(X) = E(Y|X),
 the marginal effect of a 
continuous covariate Xj is given by  
   kjXDE jXj ,,2,1;  
 
where the expectation is over the population distribution of X and 
  
   jj XXXD )(;   
The parameter ξj is the population average rate of change in µ(X) with respect to Xj, 
controlling for other factors X-j where X-j is the vector X without Xj.  
An estimator of the marginal effect ξi of Xj on Y is given by  















Here the hat (^) on µ indicates that β and ϕ have been estimated and the hat (^) on EX 

















,ij x is the partial derivative of µ(xi) with respect  to a covariate Xij for 
the model in the subsection 2.3.3. 
 
The incremental effect of a binary covariate Xj is given by 
  jjXj XDE j  ;
 
where the expected value is over X-j, marginally with respect to Xj and  
 
  ),0(),1(; jjjjjj XXXXXD   
  




An estimator of the incremental effect πj of Xj on Y is given by  














The interpretation of both ξi and πj are as effects of Xj on the mean of Y, adjusting for all 
other covariates in the model, where this adjustment is to the population distribution of X. 
When µ(X) is linear in Xj then either ξi or πj is simply equal to βj.  
Variance estimators for the marginal and incremental effects estimators are obtained 










B.1 Results: OLS on ln(Yi)   
iii xY  ln  
Table B.1: Jarque-Bera Normality Test on Residuals 
 
H0 chi sq Prob > chi sq Conclusion 
Normality of 
residuals 
9386 0.0000 Reject H0 
 
Table B.2: Regression Results 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Error Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Age -0.0160*** 0.0055 
Blood and blood 
forming organs 
0.0470** 0.0214 
Age-squared 0.0001** 0.0000 Mental disorders    0.0012 0.0351 




  0.1578*** 0.0272 




  0.1112*** 0.0373 
Co-morbidities >10 0.0795*** 0.0052 
Disorders of eye 
and adnexa 
-0.4993*** 0.0424 
ln(LOS+1) 0.7500*** 0.0059 
Diseases of ear 
and mastoid 
process 
 -0.0507* 0.0308 




Class B1 1.2717*** 0.0318 
Ischemic heart 
diseases 
 0.3676*** 0.0158 
Class B2 plus 0.8157*** 0.0406 
Other forms of 
heart diseases 
 -0.0069 0.0148 
Class B2 0.2028*** 0.0142 
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
 0.2071*** 0.0156 
ln(LOS+1)*classA 0.1111*** 0.0177 
Other circulatory 
system diseases 
  0.1167*** 0.0171 









ln(LOS+1)*classB2 0.0516*** 0.0071 
Diseases of oral 
cavity, salivary 
gland and jaws 
  0.0741 0.0641 
Female   0.0037 0.0048 
Gastrointestinal 
diseases 
 -0.0105 0.0143 
Death 0.2909*** 0.0130 






0.1217*** 0.0067 Urinary disorders 0.1372*** 0.0151 
Pvt. Health 
insurance 






  0.1817 0.1345 
Malignant neoplasm 0.1928*** 0.0149 
Ill-defined 
conditions   
 -0.0192 0.0141 
 Benign neoplasm 0.1375*** 0.0252 
Injury and 
poisoning 
 -0.0198 0.0162 
Thyroid gland 
disorders 
  0.0994** 0.0426 
Musculoskeletal 




  0.0154 0.0183 Other diseases 0.1216*** 0.0270 
Nutritional 
disorders 
  0.0920 0.0694 Constant 5.8172*** 0.2158 
Metabolic and 
immunity disorders 
0.0591*** 0.0167    
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD9 “V codes”. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
No. of Obs. = 30192 
R-squared = 0.8568 
 
Table B.3: Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
   
Test F Prob > F Conclusion 
Pregibon’s Link test F(1, 30189) = 148.09 0.0000 Failed 
Ramsey test F( 3, 30187) = 53.04 0.0000 Failed 
Hosmer–Lemeshow test F(10, 30182) = 18.50 0.0000 Failed 
 
Table B.4: Copas Test   
 
H0 Mean 1ˆ  Std.  Error Conclusion 




B.2 Results: GLM Model with Log link and Gamma family  





Variable Coef. Std. Error 
Age -0.0162** 0.0073 
Blood and blood 
forming organs 
 0.0728*** 0.0267 
Age-squared    0.0001 0.0000 Mental disorders   0.0194 0.0433 




 0.2032*** 0.0345 




  0.0919** 0.0393 
Co-morbidities >10 0.0878*** 0.0066 
Disorders of eye 
and adnexa 
 -0.3434*** 0.0490 
ln(LOS+1) 0.7359*** 0.0076 
Diseases of ear 
and mastoid 
process 
 -0.0472 0.0355 




Class B1 1.3570*** 0.0395 
Ischemic heart 
diseases 
 0.3995*** 0.0176 
Class B2 plus 0.8245*** 0.0482 
Other forms of 
heart diseases 
 -0.0307* 0.0171 
Class B2 0.1789*** 0.0181 
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
 0.1962*** 0.0175 
ln(LOS+1)*classA 0.0798*** 0.0211 
Other circulatory 
system diseases 
 0.1791*** 0.0260 





ln(LOS+1)*classB2P  -0.0746*** 0.0247 
Other respiratory 
system diseases 
 0.1093*** 0.0162 
ln(LOS+1)*classB2   0.0506*** 0.0087 
Diseases of oral 
cavity, salivary 
gland and jaws 
  0.0785 0.0534 
Female  -0.0088 0.0062 
Gastrointestinal 
diseases 
 -0.0133 0.0168 
Death 0.3350*** 0.0183 
Liver, gall and 
pancreatic 
diseases 
 0.1134*** 0.0185 
Govt. Health 
insurance 
0.1333*** 0.0089 Urinary disorders 0.1515*** 0.0179 
Pvt. Health 
insurance 
0.1716*** 0.0135 Genital disorders 0.1250*** 0.0207 
Infectious and 0.0563*** 0.0201 Congenital   0.1772 0.1403 
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parasitic diseases anomalies  
Malignant neoplasm 0.2741*** 0.0198 
Ill-defined 
conditions   
 -0.0121 0.0165 
 Benign neoplasm 0.1399*** 0.0267 
Injury and 
poisoning 
  0.0495** 0.0198 
Thyroid gland 
disorders 
  0.0667 0.0411 
Musculoskeletal 




  0.0097 0.0243 Other diseases 0.1596*** 0.0286 
Nutritional 
disorders 
  0.0707 0.0721 Constant 5.9803*** 0.2863 
Metabolic and 
immunity disorders 
0.0667*** 0.0196    
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD9 “V codes”. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
No. of Obs. = 30192 
 
Table B.6: Goodness-of-Fit Tests   
 
Test chi sq/F Prob > chi sq/ Prob >F Conclusion 
Pregibon’s Link test chi sq(1) = 81.91 0.0000 Failed 
Ramsey test chi sq(3) = 86.93 0.0000 Failed 
Hosmer –Lemeshow test F(10, 30182) = 17.59 0.0000 Failed 
 
Table B.7: Copas Test  
  
H0 Mean 1ˆ  Std. Error Conclusion 




B.3 Results: EEE model  








Age -0.0145** 0.0069 
Blood and blood 
forming organs 
0.0767*** 0.0262 
Age-squared    0.0001 0.0000 Mental disorders   0.0371 0.0396 










Co-morbidities >10  0.0853*** 0.0063 
Disorders of eye 
and adnexa 
 -0.3232*** 0.0432 
Ln(LOS+1) 0.7014*** 0.0083 
Diseases of ear 
and mastoid 
process 
 -0.0278 0.0317 
Class A 1.3457*** 0.0520 
Hypertensive 
diseases 
 -0.0745** 0.0326 
Class B1 1.1952*** 0.0452 
Ischemic heart 
diseases 
  0.3666*** 0.0169 
Class B2 plus  0.7273*** 0.0474 
Other forms of 
heart diseases 
 -0.0229 0.0159 












 -0.0421*** 0.0163 




Ln(LOS+1)*classB2 0.0493*** 0.0086 
Diseases of oral 
cavity, salivary 
gland and jaws 
  0.0761 0.0511 
Female  -0.0091 0.0059 
Gastrointestinal 
diseases 
 -0.0150 0.0158 
Death   0.3442*** 0.0181 






0.1266*** 0.0088 Urinary disorders 0.1470*** 0.0171 
Pvt. Health 
insurance 
0.1679*** 0.0136 Genital disorders 0.1169*** 0.0199 
Infectious and 0.0574*** 0.0194 Congenital   0.1654 0.1486 
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parasitic diseases anomalies 
Malignant neoplasm 0.2725*** 0.0194 
Ill-defined 
conditions   
  0.0096 0.0155 






  0.0613 0.0405 
Musculoskeletal 




  0.0209 0.0226 Other diseases 0.1421*** 0.0271 
Nutritional disorders   0.0663 0.0675 Constant  -1.7317*** 0.2725 
Metabolic and 
immunity disorders 
0.0685*** 0.0186    
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD9 “V codes”. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
No. of Obs. = 30192 
 
Table B.9: Goodness-of-Fit Tests   
 
Test chi sq/F Prob > chi sq/ Prob >F Conclusion 
Ramsey test chi sq(3) = 7442.52 0.000 Failed 
Hosmer–Lemeshow test F(10, 30182) = 4.65 0.000 Failed 
 
 
Table B.10: Copas Test 
 
H0 Mean 1ˆ  Std.  Error Conclusion 
1ˆ1   1.0001 0.0068 Rejected in 149/1000 runs 





B.4: Results: GLM with Power Link and Gamma Family 
Use optimal values of link ( = 0.0742) and variance function ( 2 = 2.0167) from EEE 
model in traditional GLM model with power link and compare results.  
 








Age -0.0011** 0.0005 
Blood and blood 
forming organs 
0.0056*** 0.0021 













Di orders of 
peripheral 
nervous system 








































































Di eases of oral 
cavity, salivary 
gland and jaws 
 0.0056 0.0058 
Female -0.0007 0.0004 



















Pvt. Health insurance 
 
0.0124*** 
















conditions   
 0.0007 0.0015 






 0.0045 0.0053 
Musculoskeletal 




 0.0015 0.0020 Other diseases 0.0107*** 0.0023 
Nutritional disorders  0.0049 0.0107 Constant 0.8718*** 0.0210 
Metabolic and 
immunity disorders 
0.0050*** 0.0018    
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD9 “V codes”. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
No. of Obs. = 30192 
 
Table B.12: Goodness-of-Fit Tests   
 
Test chi sq/F Prob > chi sq/ Prob >F Conclusion 
Pregibon’s Link test Chi sq(1) = 0.00 0.9746 Passed 
Ramsey test Chi sq(3) = 11.79 0.0081 Failed 
Hosmer –Lemeshow test F(10, 30182) = 4.44 0.0000 Failed 
 
Table B.13: Copas Test 
   
H0 Mean 1ˆ  Std. Error Conclusion 







Table C.1: Results from Fitting Conditional Pareto Distribution to Inpatient 
Expenditure  
 







Age group 64-69  0.065*** 6.29 Mental disorders   0.030     0.36 




-0.121***   -4.54 
Age group 75-79  0.075*** 7.26 
Di orders of 
peripheral nervous 
system 
  0.043    0.67 
Age group 80-84  0.015 1.41 
Di orders of eye 
and adnexa 
disorders 
  0.137** 2.56 
Gender -0.013***    -2.59 
Diseas s of ear and 
mastoid process 
0.290*** 3.46 




Implant -0.128***  -20.02 
Ischemic heart 
diseases 
 -0.044**   -2.11 
Co-morbidities>10 -0.189***  -39.92 
Other forms of 
heart diseases 
0.295***    7.86 
Class A -0.442***  -53.82 
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
-0.103***   -4.54 
Class B1 -0.412***  -53.43 
Other circulatory 
system diseases 
   0.021 0.95 




 0.391*** 6.98 
Class B2 -0.096***  -12.79 
Other respiratory 
system diseases 
 -0.037   -1.64 
Dummy for death -0.115***  -14.27 
Diseases of oral 
cavity, salivary 
gland and jaws 
  0.098 1.53 
Govt. health 
insurance 
-0.156***  -26.72 
G stroi testinal 
diseases 
  0.1468*** 6.13 
Pvt. health 
insurance 
-0.156***  -21.48 
Liver, gall and 
pancreatic diseases 
 -0.024   -1.09 
Infectious and 
parasitic diseases  
-0.044*    -1.82 Urinary disorders  -0.043*   -1.86 
Malignant 
neoplasm 
-0.083***    -4.04 Genital disorders 0.102*** 4.09 
Benign neoplasm   0.015     0.54 
Congenital 
anomalies 
 -0.013   -0.17 
Thyroid gland 
disorders 
 0.066     1.40 
Ill-defined 




 0.274*** 5.49 
Injury and 
poisoning 





-0.097    -0.94 
Musculoskeletal 
diseases 




 0.109***     3.53 Other diseases -0.026  -1.03 
Blood and blood 
forming organs 
0.079**   2.45** Constant 1.279***  57.41 
Note: Dummy variable “Other diseases” takes value 1 if the primary diagnosis is any of the diseases under 
ICD9 “V codes”. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  
y0 = 478 
No. of Obs. = 24522, Log-likelihood = -209440.62 
 
 
            Note that a lower value of  implies a higher probability of incurring huge 
hospitalization costs. Thus, a negative regression coefficient lowers α, indicating fatter 











D.1 Calibration of Parameters, Rand Data  
The mean family expenditures in the 25% and 95% plans are $1454 and $1218, 
respectively. This information is used to solve for the parameters a and γ. Using the 
calibrated values of a and γ, the distribution of  is calibrated on the basis of the 
frequency distribution of family health care expenditure under the Rand free plan in the 
following percentile intervals: 0-10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, 70-80, 80-90, 90-
95, 95-99, 99-100. 
 
The calibration exercise involves the following steps
96
: 
(a) Pick initial values of a and γ. For these values of a and γ, generate  
corresponding to the mean health expense m under the 25% plan from the FOC 
equation obtained when the household chooses m so as to maximize the utility 
function
97
 in (4.11)   



















where 0.328 is true marginal price under the 25% plan (20% plus 0.16  80%).  
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(b) Derive m for the 95% plan by substituting  from Step (a) along with the values 


















, where 0.448 is 
true marginal price under the 95% plan (20% plus 0.31  80%). 
 
(c) Compare the computed m in Step (b) with the reported average in the 95% plan. If 
they do not match then pick another combination of values of a and γ and repeat 
Steps (a)-(c) till the equivalence is obtained between the computed average and 
reported average of m.  
 
(d) Once the computed average matches with the reported one, the next step is to 
check if the medical price elasticity under 95% plan is -0.14 for the given 
combination of a and γ. If it turns out to be different from -0.14, then repeat Steps 
(a)-(d) for other combinations of a and γ until the desired result is obtained. 
 
(e) The calibrated values of a and γ from Step (d) are then used along with the 



















 to obtain distribution of  . Note that 0.2 is the 
effective marginal price of health care to the households.        
 
(f) These steps yield a combination of values of a and γ and a distribution of  which 
are used in the simulation exercise to determine the welfare maximizing level of 




E.1 Simulation Methodology for the Optimal Deductible Values, Rand Data  
 
The methodology followed for computing the values of the optimal deductible in Table 
4.2 is outlined below.    
(a) Pick initial values of premium  and deductible d. For these values of  and d, 
obtain the distribution of health services m and corresponding utilities u for the 
representative household for two cases: one, when the deductible is not exceeded 
and the other, when it is- by substituting the calibrated values of a and γ and the 
corresponding distribution of  in the two FOC equations obtained by maximizing 
the household’s utility by choice of m.98 
 
(b) For each , compare household’s utilities in both cases- when the deductible is 
not satisfied and when it is. The household would choose to pay the deductible 
only if that yields higher utility than staying within the deductible.  
 
(c) For s where the household exceeds the deductible, compute the expected value 
of payout from the insurer as follows        
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T dmf   
where f is the frequency with which a particular   occurs, n is the total number of 
s and (n-r+1) is the number of s for which the household exceeds the 
deductible. 
 
(d) Since the insurance is assumed to be actuarially fair, the expected value of payout 
from the insurer should be equal to the premium . If the computed T is not close 
to the value of  chosen in Step (a) then pick another value of  (keeping the 
value of d fixed) and repeat Steps (a)-(c) until the difference between T and   




(e) Repeat steps (a)-(d) for different values of d.       







 where n is 
the total number of s.  
(g) Compare the expected utility associated with each deductible and choose the 
deductible that generates the highest expected utility. This would constitute the 
optimal deductible. 
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 We use a cutoff point of 3. Thus, T is considered close to  if the difference between them is less than or 
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